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ARTICLE 
DO TWO WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT? 
ADJUDICATING SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
DANUBE DAM CASE 
BY STEPHEN STEC * 
The environment is not an abstraction but represents the living 
space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, 
including generations unborn. The existence of the general ob-
ligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdic-
tion and control respect the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of inter-
national law relating to the environment. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration talks of "common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities" for the future course of global sus-
tainable development: 
* Visiting Research Fellow, Leiden University Institute of East European Law 
and Russian Studies; Senior Legal Specialist, Regional Environmental Center for Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law; B.A., The Johns 
Hopkins University. 
1. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 241-242, para. 
29, cited in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 37 I.L.M. 162, 185 (1998). 
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States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to 
conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of 
the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contribu-
tions to global environmental degradation, States have 
common but differentiated responsibilities. The devel-
oped countries acknowledge the responsibility that they 
bear in the international pursuit of sustainable devel-
opment in view of the pressures their societies place on 
the global environment and of the technologies and fi-
nancial resources they command.2 
The adoption of this principle at the United N atiollS Confer-
ence on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 pro-
duced acrimonious and bipolar debate that divided developed 
from developing countries. 3 Whereas special reference was 
made to economies in transition 4 in Agenda 21,5 this general 
expression of concern did little to resolve the question of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe's position with respect to its common 
but . differentiated responsibilities, and the relationship of 
economies in transition to the dichotomy between developed 
and developing countries.6 Yet, the very process of restructur-
2. U.N. Conf. on Env't and Dev., prine. 7, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), 
reprinted in 31I.L.M. 876, 877 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration). 
3. See Ileana M. Porras, The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for International Coop-
eration, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 20, 28 (Philippe Sands ed., 1993). Porras, 
who attended some of the negotiations, noted that Russia somewhat uneasily joined 
the developed nations camp, which came to be known as the "OECD and Russia 
Group." Id. at 23 n. 10. See also Aaron Schwabach, Diverting the Danube: The Gabcik-
ovo-Nagyrnaros Dispute and International Freshwater Law, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 
290, 333 (1996) ("[M)ore than any of its predecessors, the Rio Declaration takes into 
account and expresses the needs of developing nations."). 
4. "Economies in transition" and "countries in transition" are terms applied to the 
nations of Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia making up the former Communist 
Bloc. 
5. Paragraph 1.5 of Agenda 21 states: 
[I]n the implementation of the relevant program areas identified in Agenda 21, 
special attention should be given to the particular circumstances facing the 
economies in transition. It must also be recognized that these countries are 
facing unprecedented challenges in transforming their economies, in some 
cases in the midst of considerable social and political tension. 
U.N DEPT. OF PuB. INFO., Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustain.able Develop-
ment, in AGENDA 21: THE UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME OF AcrION FROM RIO 13, 15 
(1992). 
6. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are developed in the sense of im-
pact on the global environment and in technology. The collapse of an economic system 
has rendered them less developed in the sense of the ability to bring fmancial resources 
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ing may lead to forms of assistance to the global partnership 
called for in Principle 7 that do not depend upon material 
wealth. Because of the obvious unsustainability of the previous 
developmental paradigm, the manner in which Central and 
Eastern European countries discharge their responsibilities 
ought to be uniquely informed. One form of assistance, there-
fore, may be in the progressive development of environmental 
law. 
Against this backdrop it is perhaps significant that the first 
occasion on which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) con-
sidered the principle of sustainable development 7 arose out of 
Central and Eastern Europe, the case concerning the Gabcik-
ovo-Nagymaros Project between Hungary and Slovakia.8 Ex-
pectations were high9 that the case represented an opportunity 
for the ICJ to strike a new balance between international envi-
ronmental law, in particular the law of sustainable develop-
ment with respect to an international watercourse, and the law 
of treaties. What better scenario to give some defInition to the 
notion of sustainable development than a case concerning a 
"gigomaniacal"lO scheme with its roots in the discredited and 
to bear and in terms of the implied flow of assistance from the developed to the devel· 
oping world. From a viewpoint of common but differentiated responsibilities, Central 
and Eastern Europe certainly bears a good measure of responsibility for overall global 
environmental degradation, but is ill-equipped to provide fmancial solutions. 
7. See Gabcikovo -Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998) (V.P. 
Weeramantry, separate opinion) [hereinafter Weeramantry). 
8. Gabcikovo -Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 37 I.L.M. 162 [hereinafter 
Judgment). Considering its genesis in political changes in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the dispute is linked to issues other than environmental ones. See Paul R. 
Williams, International Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Dispute Between Slo· 
vakia and Hungary Concerning Construction of the Gabcikovo and Nagymaros Dams, 
19 COL. J. ENV. LAw 1, 3 (1994) (mentioning minority rights, inviolability of interna-
tional borders, and the "lingering power of the communist apparatus"). See also dis-
cussion infra notes 80-106. 
9. See, e.g., Schwabach, supra note 3, at 341 (noting that the decision of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute should provide a "much-
needed and long-awaited clarification" of the customary international law regarding 
the non-navigational use of international freshwater resources). See also Gabriel Eck-
stein, Application of International Water Law to Transboundary Groundwater Re-
sources, and the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 19 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 67, 114 (1995) (noting that the case "presents an opportunity for 
the development of international water law and for the application of an integrated 
approach to the management and protection of shared water resources"). 
10 In the words of Vaclav Havel, see Czechoslovak President on Security Co-
operation and Nagymaros Barrage, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb. 18, 
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inherently unsustainable form of development known as scien-
tific socialism? 
The dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over the con-
struction of a system of barrages on the Danube presented an 
extraordinarily complex set of facts of a technical nature, espe-
cially with respect to the assessment of the potentia.l environ-
mental impacts of the project. The case presented an opportu-
nity for the consideration of the extent to which environmental 
concerns could justify the substantial reformation Oll" termina-
tion of a treaty-based regime. In so doing the ICJ could give 
shape to developing concepts such as sustainable development 
and the precautionary principle. As the dispute involved the 
unilateral diversion of the Danube by Czechoslovakia,11 the 
Court had the opportunity to elaborate on the development of 
international law concerning shared natural resources, in par-
ticular pertaining to the equitable and reasonable use of a 
transboundary watercourse, recently clarified through the 
1991, Pt. 2, Eastern Europe; A. International Affairs; 2 USSR-Eastern European 
Relations; EE/0999/A2/1. See Judgment, supra note 8, at 182, para. 38. Compare the 
statement of Janos Martonyi, State Secretary of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 
quoted in Judith Ingram, Slovaks Pushing Danube Project, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,1992,1 
at 13, in Williams, supra note 8, at 3 ("[Flor us, [the Gabcikovol power station is a 
manifestation of voluntarist gigantoinania and disdain for public opinion and science. 
In Slovakia, however, this power station stands for new national independence, na· 
tional pride and Slovak strength, will, decisiveness and creativity.") Compare the 
description of Mikulas Huba, former Chairman of the Committee on Environmental 
Protection of the Slovakian Parliament, of the application of "foreign, i.e., Soviet mod-
els and methods" to the Slovakian environment, including "unnecessarily megaloma-
niac plants." Mikulas Huba, Slovak Republic, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE 
FOR CENTRAL EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 230 (Jurg KIarer & Bedich 
Moldan eds., 1997). Huba describes the Gabcikovo·Nagymaros Project dispute as a 
conflict between two camps, members of which can be found on both sides of the bor-
der-the old fashioned technocratic approach to nature, and preservation of natural 
and cultural values and sustainable development. Id. at 233. See also Boldizsar Nagy, 
The Danube Dispute: Conflicting Paradigms, ISTER (November 1992), cited in Judit 
Galambos, An International Environmental Conflict on the Danube: The Gabcikovo· 
Nagymaros Dams, in ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: POLICIES AND 
POLITICS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 176, 221 n.27 (A. Vari & P. Tamas eds., 
1993) !hereinafter Galambos I)) (describing the conflict as one between two paradigms, 
in similar terms). 
11. Following the 1989 transformations, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic be-
came the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, then in the "velvet divorce" split into two 
independent countries on Jan. 1 1993. For simplicity's sake, both the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic are generally referred to 
as Czechoslovakia herein. In the ICJ case, Slovakia was found to have succeeded to 
Czechoslovakia's rights and obligations. 
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. 12 The Court 
had the opportunity to balance two interests--each of which 
involved an intrusion upon sovereignty-first, the interest in 
enforceable rules of conduct guiding relations among nations 
and, second, the interest in protecting the common heritage of 
mankind against ill-conceived development. 13 
II. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A PRINCIPLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The construct of "sustainable development"14 is an attempt 
to embody a set of values, in which better account is taken of 
previously uncaptured environmental impacts arising from 
traditional forms of development. 15 In general, it refers to an 
approach towards economic development, taking the environ-
ment into account, that meets the needs of the present genera-
tion without depriving future generations of the ability to meet 
their own needs. 16 Thus, it requires the integration of envi-
12. 36I.L.M. 700 (1997) [hereinafter Non-Navigational Uses Convention). 
13. See Stephen Stec & Gabriel E. Eckstein, Of Solemn Oaths and Obligations: 
The Environmental Impact of the ICJ's Decision in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project, 8 Y.B. INT'L. ENV'T. L. 41,42 (1998). 
14. There is no single formulation for the definition of sustainable development. 
The term appeared in an early conspicuous form in the work of the Experts Group on 
Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
("Brundtland Commission"). BRUNDTLAND COMM'N, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1986). Al-
though the term was not used specifically in the 1984 mandate for the Brundtland 
Commission, an even earlier use can be found in IUCNIUNEP/WWF, WORLD CON-
SERVATION STRATEGY: LMNG RESOURCE CONSERVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DE-
VELOPMENT (1980). Precursors to the concept can be seen in the Founex meeting of 
experts in Switzerland in June 1971, see SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 143 (Winfried Lang ed., 1971), and the conference on environment and 
development in Canberra in the same year, and U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
2849 (XXVI). See Weeramantry, 37 I.L.M. at 206. 
15. The failure of traditional forms of development to take into account environ-
mental costs - externalities - was legendarily put forward in G. Hardin, The Tragedy 
of the Commons, SCIENCE 162,1243 (1968). One commentator argues that the failure 
to internalize externalities is a cause of the divergence of individual and national eco-
nomics. Christian Leipert, Grundfragen einer okologisch ausgerichteten Wirtschafts-
und Umweltpolitik, Aus POLITIK & ZEITGESCHICHTE B 27/88, 29-37 (1988) (supplement 
to Das Parlament), cited in HARALD HOHMANN, PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES AND 
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 4 n.22 (1994). 
16. See Rio Declaration, supra note 2, princ. 3. Principle 3 states "[t]he right to 
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environ-
5
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ronmental and development policies. 17 The concept, which 
originally focused on stable local resource bases,18 has steadily 
grown in scope and significance. 19 
Sustainable development has rapidly received currency and 
acceptance by representatives of a wide range of interests. 
This is because it is sufficiently vague and flexible to be used 
for many purposes. The attractiveness of "sustainable devel-
opment" as a concept does not depend upon a strict definition. 20 
Its vagueness is in fact one of its most useful attributes, as it 
merely establishes an ill-defined goal while admitting that the 
mental needs of present and future generations." Compare Stockholm Declaration on 
the Human Environment, UN Doc. AlCONF.48/14/Rev.1 (UN Pub. E.73, IIA.14) princ. 
13 (1973). 
17. Rio Declaration, supra note 2, princs. 2, 4. 
18. The Brundtland Commission in OUR COMMON FUTuRE preferred to focus on 
particular resource bases and defined sustainable use or development as a use which 
maintains and enhances renewable natural resource bases without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs from the same resource base. 
HOHMANN, supra note 15, at 2 traces the concept of sustainable development to the late 
eighteenth century "sustaining principle" developed with respect to forestry. This 
principle, applicable only to renewable resources, required resource functions to be 
sustainable indefinitely, spanning generations, and depended upon active manage-
ment. The same principle is evidently at work in the examples from all over the world 
pointed out by Weeramantry, infra note 172, some of them reaching back millennia 
into the past. Note, however, that no concepts of sustainability have sufficiently taken 
non-renewable resources into account. 
19. The United Nations Council on Sustainable Development held its flrst meeting 
in 1993. A signiflcant parrallel initiative consists of the National Councils for Sustain-
able Development organized by the Earth Council, based in San Jose, Costa Rica, and 
chaired by Maurice Strong. President Bill Clinton established the President's Council 
on Sustainable Development by Executive Order No. 12852 on June 19, 1993. Organi-
zations such as the World Business Councils for Sustainable Development, the Asia 
Pacillc Sustainable Development Center, the Sustainable Development Institute, and 
the Sustainable Development Research Institute have sprung up in the last decade. 
An internet search for the term "sustainable development" done on March 7, 1999 
resulted in 70,400 hits, some of which are contained on a "Sustainability Web Ring." 
20. In fact, there is already some evidence that it may be an interim or temporary 
formulation that will be supplanted by a more precise term. Compare the term "sus-
tainable society." See, e.g., WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, BmLDING A SUSTAINABLE 
SOCIETY (1981). Cf. Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law from Stock-
Iwlm to Rio: Back to the Future? in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 3, at 
13-16 (arguing that a shift in terminology from "sustainable development" to "sustain-
able growth" indicates a restoration of the "mythology of economic growth"). See also 
ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: BmLDING ON 
BRUNDTLAND (R. Goodland et a1. eds., 1991). The term "sustainable development" may 
be an oxymoron and raises many more questions than it answers. It begs the question 
whether in fact development as understood in terms of the present paradigm of eco-
nomic growth can ever be sustainable. 
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means of reaching it are not only unclear, but may also involve 
enormous costs. 21 The intensifying social debate over sustain-
able development and environmental protection generally has 
helped to promote a shift; towards longer-term thinking in eco-
nomics and other fields. As a great unknown, it may set the 
stage for major developments in thinking and new approaches 
to problem-solving. 22 
It is settled that sustainable development seeks to integrate 
environment and development.23 One view of the path followed 
by international environmental law holds that in any confron-
tation between environment and development, development 
naturally prevails. 24 According to this view, the international 
law of sustainable development represents an absorption of 
environmental law into the law of development. 25 Increasingly, 
however, the notion that international environmental law or 
the international law of sustainable development has special 
characteristics that may have application in other areas of do-
mestic and international law is being recognized. 26 A main ex-
21. As a result, the struggle between developed and developing blocs, evident at 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992, to give shape to the concept of sustainable development according to various 
interpretations can be expected to sharpen. The fact that many writers point out that 
sustainable development is universally accepted indicates that the various interests 
are clamoring over ownership of the term. See, e.g., Weeramantry, 37 I.L.M. at 207 
("[Tlhe concept of sustainable development is thus a principle accepted not merely by 
the developing countries, but one which rests on a basis of worldwide acceptance") (em-
phasis added). 
22. See HOHMANN, supra note 15, at 4 n.24 (stating that economists have dis-
cussed the social costs of pollution since the 1980s, but today these costs are still not 
widely recognized). 
23. See Rio Declaration, supra note 2. The Preamble to the Rio Declaration refers 
to "the integrity of the global environmental and developmental system." [d. Principle 
2 repeats the formulation of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, while adding 
the words "and developmental" between "environmental" and "policies." [d. Principle 4 
states: "[I)n order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall 
constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in 
isolation from it." [d. at 877. Principle 25 provides: "[Pleace, development and envi-
ronmental protection are interdependent and indivisible." [d. at 880. 
24. See Pallemaerts, supra note 20. 
25. See id. 
26. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflec-
tions on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 125-128 
(1992) (stating that international environmental law has special characteristics, so 
that traditional rules of state responsibility are insufficient). See also HOHMANN, su-
pra note 15, at 335 n.12. 
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ample is the precautionary principle, developed out of the need 
to reach beyond traditional liability notions. 27 
The extension of the precautionary principle from a German 
administrative norm,28 to one of the most fundamental emerg-
ing norms of international environmental law29 is an example 
of the link between domestic and international law in the field 
of the environment. The importance of linking international 
and domestic environmental law has been explained through 
the theory on compatibility of international and national envi-
ronmentallaw.30 This theory brings attention to the interde-
pendence of international and national environmental law and 
the need for integration. According to this theory, interna-
tional and national environmental law are inherently linked. 
International law in the field of environmental protection often 
arises out of the need to recognize common progressive devel-
opments in domestic legal systems, or to address particular 
27. See HOHMANN, supra note 15. Although Hohmann describes the exact con-
tours of the precautionary principle as being unclear, he lists certain obligations that 
are indisputably recognized as being a part of the precautionary principle, including 
obligations for minimization of conceivable causes of environmental damage according 
to accepted standards; obligations for avoidance of production of wastes and of the 
transporting of hazardous substances; obligations for the recycling of waste; the princi-
ple of preservation of the environmental status quo; the need for continuous considera-
tion of environmental concerns during planning and decision-making; proactive envi-
ronmental management; efficient use of natural resources, and restrictions on mar-
keting of hazardous substances. See id. at 10-11. A corollary of the precautionary 
principle is the rule that positivistic solutions prove to be disastrous because of the 
inability to predict all the consequences of a particular decision. A proper respect for 
uncertainty leads one to tread softly on unknown territory-otherwise damage is sure 
to result. See generally Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and tlu! Precautionary 
Principle, 33 ENV'T 4 (1991). 
28. The precautionary principle in international law has its origins in the Vorsor-
geprinzip of German law. 
29. See, e.g., HOHMANN, supra note 15, at 333-34; David Freestone & Ellen Hey, 
Origins and Development of tlu! Precautionary Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 4 n.13 
(Freestone & Hey eds., 1996), and sources cited therein. This principle is a general 
principle of administrative law found in many continental legal systems. It entered 
into the international arena through regional agreements on the North Sea. See TIu! 
North Sea: Perspecitive on Regional Environmental Cooperation, 5 INT'L J. ESTUARINE 
& COASTAL L. (David Freestone & Ton Ijlstra eds., 1990) (special issue). While the 
precautionary principle may have come into international law in this way, Weeraman-
try persuasively argues that the same principle may be found in indigenous civiliza-
tions around the world, infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
30. See JONAS EBBESSON, COMPATIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1996). 
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international concerns through analogy to domestic situations. 
Meanwhile, international legal developments require transpo-
sition of their principles into domestic legislation, or under 
some legal systems are directly applicable and compose a part 
of the corpus of national law. Insofar as environmental protec-
tion challenges are global or at least transboundary in scope, 
the traditional structural impediment of sovereignty is par-
ticularly anachronistic in relation to environmental law.3! 
Consequently the distinction between international and na-
tional environmental law ought to become progressively 
blurred. 32 This adds another dimension of integration to the 
Rio Declaration's call for integration of environmental protec-
tion with development. 
Environmental law has a role to play in the development of 
domestic law and practice, especially in the contexts of human 
rights, sustainable development, and intergenerational equity. 
Courts around the world are responding to a growing number 
of cases with difficult and sometimes innovative decisions. But 
environmental law also has played a significant role in more 
general and theoretical international law concepts such as 
state responsibility.33 It has been said that "[i]nternational en-
vironmental law is one of the most energetic fields of interna-
tionallaw. It appears that its contribution to international law 
will continue."34 Thus, rather than absorption of environmental 
law into development law, the path of the development of envi-
ronmental law is one of the adsorption of environmental law 
31. See id. at 48·62. Ebbesson discusses monist and dualist theories of the rela· 
tionship between international and national law, and concludes that any distinctions 
between the two are artificial ones arising out of the conceptual basis of sovereignty. 
Id. 
32. Consequently any ·setbacks" in the international arena ought to be considered 
in the light of the growth of the unity of international and national environmental law. 
The ·Rio Reaction" may be seen therefore as an anachronistic assertion of sovereignty 
that will be overcome by events. 
33. See Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Contribution of Environmental Law to the De· 
velopment of Modern International Law, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw AT THE 
THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 909,925 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996). Fitzmaurice 
alludes to the lockstep development of international and national environmental law 
when discussing the extent to which theoretical concepts have entered practice. 
34. [d. 
9
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principles onto other fields oflaw.35 The integration of intern a-
tional and national environmental law indicates that environ-
mental law will be a vehicle for progressive development of 
both international and domestic law. Environmental law re-
form is at once an expression as well as a vehicle for sustain-
able development. 
III. POTENTIAL FOR THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE LAW OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
A ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
The environmental legacy of the communist economic sys-
tem is well-documented.36 Although Chernobyl is the most 
highly evident single manifestation of the Soviet Union's envi-
ronmentally damaging policies, it represents only the tip of the 
iceberg. Decades of scientific socialism left large parts of the 
former Communist Bloc in a state of severe environmental deg-
radation,37 with a resultant devastating impact on nature.38 
35. Although in a different context, see Vladimir Pastukhov, The End of Postcom-
munism: Perspectives on Russian Reformers, 7 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 64,64-70 (Summer 
1998) (pointing to "absorption" of new institutions into state structures). 
36. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, AN As-
SESSMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN COUNTRIES IN 
TRANSITION (Geneva, 1995). Several shocking compilations of the extent of environ-
mental degradation in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe have been 
made. See, e.g., MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE USSR: 
HEALTH AND NATURE UNDER SIEGE (1992); RUBEN MNATSAKANIAN, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LEGACY OF THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS (1992); JOAN DEBARDELEN, TO BREATHE 
FREE: EASTERN EUROPE'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS (1991); ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 
AND QUALITY AFTER COMMUNISM (JOAN DEBARDELEN & JOHN HANNIGAN eds., 1995); 
Bo LIBERT, ENVIRONMENTAL HERITAGE OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE (OECD, 1995); D. J. 
PETERSON, TROUBLED LANDS: THE LEGACY OF SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAl. DESTRUCTION 
(1993); Hilary F. French, Green Revolutions: Environmental Reconstruction in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE (Series No. 99 Nov. 1990). 
37. Depending on the local circumstances, the huge physical transti>rmation of the 
environment undertaken in two or three generations highly degraded the air (in Pra-
gue, for example, average concentrations of sulfur dioxide were double the World 
Health Organization standard, with 24 hour events of 60 times the WHO standard, see 
Richard N. L. Andrews, Environmental Policy in the Czech and Slovak Republic, in 
ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: POLICIES AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 10, at 12), water (seventy percent of the surface waters in 
Czechoslovakia were considered to be heavily polluted in 1992, and 30% were biologi-
cally dead; heavy metal concentrations in drinking water exceeded standards in 123 
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Many health problems compounded by breakdowns in social 
services and economic security in Central and Eastern Europe 
could be traced to environmental degradation. 39 Prior to the 
fall of the Soviet Union, Soviet scholars estimated the costs of 
environmental damage in 1990 as 15 to 17 percent of GNP.40 
This figure, which did not include time lost as a result of envi-
ronmentally-related illnesses, was 11 to 15 times higher than 
the budgetary amount allocated to environmental protection. 41 
towns serving half a million people, see id. at 13) and soil (in Belarus, for example, 
264,000 hectares of arable land lay fallow because of environmental contamination, 
and in 65% of the whole territory of the country the "ecological volume" was exhausted 
completely or overloaded, see PROPOSALS OF STATE COMMI'ITEE FOR ECONOMY AND 
PLANNING AND STATE COMMI'ITEE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN 
THE FIELD OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Belarus 1992». The situation is most 
easily seen in deep pockets of industrial development which are among the most pol-
luted places on earth. Such places include Silesia, Northern Bohemia, Zhaporizhzhye, 
Copsa Mica, the Donbass, Norilsk, and the Aral Sea. Outside these heavily polluted 
areas, however, ambient pollution levels are also high. "[Tlhe density of pollution per 
one square kilometre in the Ukraine is more than six and a half times higher than in 
the United States and more than 3.2 times higher than in the EC Member States." Y. 
Shemshuchenko, Human Rights in the Field of Environmental Protection i,n the Draft 
of the New Constitution of the Ukraine, in ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS: LAw, LITIGATION & 
ACCESS To JUSTICE 38 (S. Diemann & B. Dyssli eds., 1996). See generally EUROPE'S 
ENVIRONMENT: THE DOBRIS ASSESSMENT (David Stanners & Philippe Bourdeau eds., 
1995). 
38. In Czechoslovakia in the 1980s, for example, 50 to 90 species were considered 
endangered, "far more than in most other countries." Over 70% of the forests were 
damaged. Andrews, supra-note 37, at 13. 
39. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN SE'ITLEMENTS UNDER 
TRANSITION: THE CASE OF EASTERN EUROPE & THE CIS 85-86 (1996) [hereinafter 
SE'ITLEMENTS REPORT). The report specifically mentions high levels of lead leading to 
brain damage and learning disabilities in the Czech Republic, infertility among Lat-
vian men linked to the Chemobyl cleanup, leukemia and brain tumors in Lithuanian 
children, low birth weights in the Russian Federation linked to toxic waste, pesticides 
and radiation. Other studies point to impacts on human health (the incidence of respi-
ratory diseases was high in Czechoslovakia, and allergies in children increased ten-fold 
during the 1980s, Andrews, supra note 37, at 12), life expectancy (life expectancy in 
Ukraine declined by 5 years for women and 10 years for men in the 1980s, see Pamela 
Bickford Sak, Environmental Law in Ukraine: From the Roots to the Bud, 11 UCLA J. 
ENVI'L. L. REV. 203,212-13 (1993); life expectancy in Czechoslovakia was 3 to 6 years 
behind its Western neighbors in the late 1980s, see Andrews, supra note 37, at 12), and 
infant mortality. 
40. See Izvestiya ARademii nauk SSSR, Seriya ekonomicheskaya 3, 22-30 (May-
June 1990); see also JPRS·TEN-90·009, 2 August 1990, at 21-27, cited in ECOCIDE IN 
THE USSR: HEALTH AND NATURE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 36, at 254. 
41. See Izvestiya ARademii nauk SSSR, Seriya ekonomicheskaya 3, 22-30 (May-
June 1990); see also JPRS-TEN-90-009, 2 August 1990, at 21-27, cited in ECOCIDE IN 
THE USSR: HEALTH AND NATURE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 36, at 254. 
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Nor have matters changed significantly in large parts of the 
former Eastern Bloc. 42 
Environmental degradation contributed to a high level of 
environmental awareness. Sociological studies undertaken in 
the latter years of Communism found that environmental pro-
tection and nature were among the highest concerns of average 
citizens.43 In the euphoric aftermath of the revolutions it was 
generally considered to be the highest priority of new govern-
ments, at least for a time.44 A 1990 survey in the USSR found 
that environmental issues were at the center of public con-
cerns, even though economic issues had become most 
42. For more recent information on the environment in Central Europe specifi· 
cally, see THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE FOR CENTRAL EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN 
TRANSITION, supra note 10. SOx emissions per unit of GDP in East Central Europe 
were still approximately ten times as high as in Western Europe in 1993 (according to 
1996 World Bank, id. at 10, tbl. 1.3). Figures for NOx and CO2 emissions per unit of 
GDP were double Western European levels, according to the same study. In the field of 
environmental protection, fiscal crises in Central and Eastern Europe have resulted in 
a sharp drop in the official attention given to the environment. The funds allocated to 
environmental programs in Ukraine, for example, dropped between 1988 and 1993 
from more than 1 percent of GNP to only 0.2 percent. Shemshuchenko, supra note 37, 
at 38. Accord, S. Kravchenko, Environmental Legislation and Enforcement in Ukraine, 
in A WORLD SURVEY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 438 (S. Nespor ed., 1996) (special issue 
of RIVISTA GIURIDICA DELL'AMBIENTE) (noting that some countries outside the region 
spend up to 5 percent of GNP on environmental protection). Furthermore, between 
1986 and 1996 the number of cases in which criminal charges were brought for envi-
ronmental offenses in Ukraine dropped by three-fourths. See Shemshuchenko, supra 
note 37, at 38. This figure must be seen in the light of the re-characterization of many 
types of "crimes against the state" as civil matters, however. See S. Stec, Manual on 
Public Participation, in ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING: CURRENT PRACTICE AND 
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (BALTIC SUPPLEMENT) 17 
(1995). 
43. See, e.g., Boris Z. Doktorov et al., Ecological Consciouness in the USSR: Enter-
ing the 1990s, in ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: POLICIES AND POLITICS 
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE., supra note 10, at 249-67; ZSUZSA LEHOCZKI & 
VICTORIA SZI RMAI , MINISTRY FOR ENVfL PROTECTION & WATER MGMT, KOR-
NYEZETALLAPOT ES ERDEKVISZONYOK AJKAN (1988), cited in Zsuzsa Lehoczki & 
Zsuzsanna Balogh, Hungary, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE FOR CENTRAL 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 10, at 163. See also FESHBACH & 
FRIENDLY, supra note 36. 
44. In the first opinion poll taken in the Czech Republic after the Velvet Revolu-
tion, in January 1990, more than 80% of Czech citizens surveyed declared that the 
environment should be the top priority of the new government, ahead of economic is-
sues. See Bedich Moldan, Czech Republic, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE FOR 
CENTRAL EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 10, at 118. In early 1990 
the poor state of the environment was the number one priority of the public, according 
to opinion polls in Slovakia. See Huba, supra note 10, at 257. 
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pressing. 45 More recent studies show that environmental is-
sues continue to enjoy a high level of passive support. 46 
B. GREEN REVOLUTIONS, 1986-1991 
Environmental issues were historically significant in the 
political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe.47 The 
extent of environmental degradation in the region was ever 
increasing and the concomitant impacts on human health and 
well-being ever more evident. In the late 1980s the people of 
Central and Eastern Europe were confronted with a series of 
events that confirmed the ultimate unsustainability of the sys-
tem of social and economic development they were living 
under.48 While some have stated that the environment pro-
vided a politically uncontroversial set of social issues for dissi-
dence to adhere to,49 this is not entirely true. A closer look re-
veals a situation in which hard-liners were immovable, but a 
good many more reasonable authorities were willing to engage 
45. See Boris Z. Doktorov et al., Ecological Consciousness in the USSR: Entering 
the 1990s, in ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: POLICIES AND POLITICS IN 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE., supra note 10, at 250. This study also found these 
values to be held widely across divisions in society. A difference could be seen among 
~materialist" and "post·materialist" values primarily based upon generational shift, 
indicating that changes of behavior to protect the environment would not come until 
the generational change had come into effect. Id. 
46. A 1995 public opinion survey conducted in the Russian Federation found a 
high level of support for environmental protection. See OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, 
PROTECTING EURASIA'S DISPOSSESSED 48 (1996). The assistance organization Charities 
Aid surveyed 1007 people in Moscow and the surrounding region on public attitudes 
towards charity and donation and found that, in principle, people gave most support to 
protection of animals, people with disabilities, the elderly, and the environment. Id. at 
49. A survey on environmental awareness conducted by the European Commission in 
1996 also found a deeply held concern for the environment. This report was a confiden-
tial document as of the end of 1997. 
47. See generally ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: POLICIES AND 
POLITICS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 10; DANIEL H. COLE, IN-
STITUTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: FROM RED TO GREEN IN POLAND (1998); 
BARBARA HICKS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN POLAND: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT BETWEEN 
REGIME AND OPPOSITION (1996); BERND BAUMGARTL, TRANSITION AND SUSTAINABILITY: 
ACTORS AND INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES (1997) 
!hereinafter BAUMGARTL IJ. 
48. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
49. See French, supra note 36 (The region's communist governments initially per-
ceived the movement as relatively benign.); F. J. M. FELDBRUGGE, RUSSIAN LAw: THE 
END OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF LAw 295 (1993) (referring to environ-
mental issues as "comparatively harmless politically"). 
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in a debate about the future of the Party, 50 a debate which 
opened further as environmental movements became popular-
ized. 
Under the legal administrative structure of the prior so-
cialist regimes, the "unspecialized" public occupied a social 
space far from the centers of power. Within a particular seg-
ment of society, the upper echelons of the hierarchy resolved 
conflicts of opinion and presented the results to the central 
authorities. As a consequence, grassroots initiatives had great 
difficulty organizing into a movement and gaining access to 
lines of communication and other structures rigidly controlled 
by the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, in this century, the envi-
ronmentalist movement in Central and Eastern Europe strug-
gled within and against authoritarian structures, initially for 
recognition, and eventually in opposition. 
Many signs point to the Chernobyl disaster51 as a turning 
point in the history of scientific socialism. After Chernobyl, 
marginal groups of intellectuals and environmentalists who 
50. In fact, there is evidence that before Chernobyl, authorities took great pains to 
suppress environmentally·based dissent as well as other forms; there was very little 
room for toleration of "independent" activity of any kind. French, herself, mentions the 
imprisonment of a Czech scientist for writing letters and a parody criticizing the envi-
ronmental situation, and the confiscation in November 1987 of literature and a print-
ing press from an environmental library set up by the Lutheran Church in East Berlin. 
French, supra note 36, at 32. In 1987 in Bulgaria, Communist Party members who 
tried to form an officially registered environmentalist organization with the intention 
of starting a dialogue within the Party were expelled from the Party and harassed, and 
their activities were banned. Moreover, the degree of toleration of Eastern European 
regimes in the late 1980s varied, from the relatively open Soviet and Hungarian re-
gimes to the conservative and reactionary Czechoslovak, East German, and Romanian 
regimes. See id. 
51. The accident involving the Chernobyl nuclear power station north of Kyiv 
which occurred in April 1986 has an estimated total impact in terms of excess deaths of 
up to 200,000 in the current generation (there are 400,000 official "victims of Cherno-
byl" in Ukraine alone), with untold billions in extra health care costs expected. The 
Chernobyl accident and its aftermath are described in harrowing detail in PIERS PAUL 
READ, ABLAZE: THE STORY OF THE HEROES AND VICTIMS OF CHERNOBYL (1993). See 
also GRIGORI MEDVEDEV, No BREATHING ROOM: THE AFTERMATH OF CHERNOBYL 
(Evelyn Rossiter trans., 1993); GRIGORI MEDVEDEV, THE TRUTH ABOUT CHERNOBYL 
(Evelyn Rossiter trans., 1992). The cost of just the sarcophagus to stabilize the ex-
ploded reactor in the short-term is estimated at $3 billion. The amount necessary to 
redress the full impact of the catastrophe is beyond imagination. Early estimates ran 
as high as 250 billion Soviet rubles in 1990. See FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 36, 
at 257. 
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had trouble fi]]jng meeting rooms in 1983-84 suddenly found 
themselves in the spotlight, leading mass movements. 52 Activ-
ism exploded and it was this explosion which posed the great-
est challenges to long-standing assumptions. 53 The public was 
righteously angry, and this anger served to focus the attention 
of the people on fundamental flaws in their economic and po-
litical system, wholly separate from historical ideological ar-
guments that might earlier have been used to squelch dissent. 
After Chemobyl, with full knowledge of the potential political 
outcome, even the hard-liners had no personal moral choice but 
to accept the justifiable criticism of the public. Eventually rec-
ognition of social groups was offered, but by then forces had 
been unleashed that would bring governments down through-
out the region. 54 
52. "[Elarly efforts revolved around a small, elite group that was able to exert in-
fluence through back channels to those in power. In the words of Russian environmen-
talist Natalya Yourina, '[iln the sixties, only individuals protested. A movement didn't 
exist.' This changed when the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 combined with glasnost 
to give rise to a widespread movement encompassing diverse segments of society.n 
French, supra note 36, at 30. See also Elizabeth Darby Junkin, Green Cries {rom Red 
Square, BUZZWORM (Mar.-Apr. 1990); Ann Sheehy & Sergei Voronitsyn, Ecological 
Protest in the USSR, 1986-88, in RADIO LIBERTY RESEARCH REPORT (May 11, 1988); 
ERlC GREEN, ECOLOGY AND PERESTROIKA: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE 
SOVIET UNION (1990). See also Oleg Yanitsky, Environmental Initiatives in Russia: 
East-West Comparisons, in ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: POLICIES 
AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 10, at 120, 131-32. 
Yanitsky clearly points out that the very small {irst steps towards civil environmental 
initiatives developed before 1986, clandestinely in an atmosphere of alienation, disillu-
sion, and "psychological tension.n Id. 
53. "We are especially interested in the process of public participation which be-
gan to develop rapidly in Russian cities in the second half of the 1980s.n Yanitsky, 
supra note 52, at 120. 
54. The process of change in Eastern Europe leading to the revolutions of 1989-91 
went through several distinct stages. Yanitsky, in discussing the environmental 
movement in Russia, divided recent times into two "macro-social contextsn-the context 
of stagnation (the 1970s and flrst half of the 1980s) and the context of rapid changes 
(the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s). Id. In the immediate wake of 
Chernobyl, there was a release of pent-up social demands focusing on environmentalist 
expressions, in which dissident elements seized the opportunity of public fear and 
mistrust to push for greater openness and independence from the center. The authori-
ties at this time retreated in the arena of environmental concerns, but held ground in 
other areas. In the second stage the authoritarian structures countered with an offer 
of reforms involving disclosure of information and the establishment of new state-
sponsored organizations, while refusing to negotiate on the ultimate issue of power. 
Such measures were rejected by the bulk of society, which elected to pursue its goals 
underground, again in the nominal form of environmentalist movements. In the fmal 
stage, the state apparatus itself became polarized between conservatives and the dis-
15
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Information played a key role. The environmentalist 
movement grew by making public, information that previously 
had circulated clandestinely. 55 In the wake of Chemobyl, the 
environmental movement was the main conduit for information 
to the public. 56 Once environmental information became public, 
the opposition used it as a delegitimizing tool against the gov-
ernment.57 Thus, the environmentalist movement a<:tually be-
came an alternative, reliable source of information even for 
authorities, 58 contributing to its legitimacy and making it in-
dispensable to the continued proper functioning of the state in 
the face of new and complex challenges. Moreover, in no field 
were the symptoms of the decline of monolithic decision-
making and the rise of political pluralism more evident than in 
that of environmental protection. 59 Consequently, environmen-
illusioned, who undermined the system in sympathy with the public, gradually differ· 
entiating into broad·based movements, until key defections on the international stage 
forced the capitulation of the conservatives. There were variations, country by country, 
in particular between states in which the Party was internally divided and states 
where a conservative regime held sway. There was also a particular distinction be-
tween the countries of East Central Europe, including the Baltic states, where de-
mands for the creation of a civic sphere became popularized, and the rest of the Soviet 
Union and Southeastern Europe where they did not. Furthermore, the revolutions 
themselves took place in complex stages. The two major watersheds of course were the 
overthrow of communist regimes in the satellite states in 1989, and the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1991. But in the various successor states and in 
the new, democratic regimes the political pendulums have swung to varying degrees. 
55. See, e.g., TOWN COMMITI'EE OF BRATISLAVA, BRATISLAVA ALOUD (1987). 
BRATISLAVA ALOUD was an "environmental political" pamphlet issued by the Town 
Committee of Bratislava (SZOPK) in 1987. The tradition can be traced to a quintessen-
tial samizdat publication-an environmentalist tract circulated clandestinely in 1978 
which was later published in the U.S. as BORIS KOMAROV, THE DESTRUCTION OF 
NATURE IN THE SOVIET UNION (1980). 
56. By contrast, the first official government report on the environment in the So-
viet Union was not issued until 1989. USSR STATE COMMITI'EE FOR NATURE PRO· 
TECTION, REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE USSR (1989). 
57. See Stanley J. Kabala, Environmental Affairs and the Emergence of Pluralism 
in Poland, in ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: POLICIES AND POLITICS IN 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 10, at 62. 
58. It was also a phenomenon of the time that the upper echelons of the Commu-
nist Party could no longer rely upon the information being passed up to them from 
below, because of the increasing dichotomy between ideal and reality and the pervad-
ing fear of admission of overwhelming failures. This had even occurred in the Cherno-
byl disaster, as Mikhail Gorbachev was initially sheltered by a chain of subordinates 
afraid to be the bearers of bad news. See READ, supra note 51. 
59. In Poland, for example, it has been noted that the "communist-dominated pol-
ity was transformed by the emergence of a range of environmental interest groups that 
sprung up to parallel and challenge the country's governmental bodies and officially 
sanctioned organizations." Kabala, supra note 57, at 62. In Bulgaria, "environmental 
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talism was at the heart of the democratization movement in 
Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s.60 The environ-
mental movement had become a magnet for dissatisfied people 
of all stripes, as it offered one of the only legitimate means for 
expressing alternative views.61 Throughout the 1980s, but es-
pecially after Chernobyl, the scope of what society considered 
to be legitimate subjects for the environmental movement 
broadened significantly. Increasingly the authorities were 
forced to take notice. 
concerns provided the common ground for antitotalitarian opposition." Kristalina 
Georgieva, Environmental Policy in a Transition Economy: The Bulgarian Example, in 
ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: POLICIES AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 10, at 67. Recognition of environmental problems in 
Czechoslovakia penetrated more deeply from intellectual circles to the general public in 
the second half of the 1980s. See Huba, supra °note 10, at 255. In Slovakia, "[mlore 
than half of the first protagonists of the 'Velvet Revolution' ... were members of the 
environmental movement.... There was a certain equivalency attributed to environ· 
mentalism and revolution." Id. at 257. 
60. "It was the environmentalist movement which signaled the coming changes in 
Bulgaria at the end of the eighties." Nikolai Genov, Environmental Risks in a Society 
in Transition: Perceptions and Reactions, in ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION: POLICIES AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 10, 
at 280. Moreover, in Bulgaria: 
After decades of totalitarian lethargy, [environmental issuesl were the issues 
which brought to public attention the negative impacts of the so-called social-
ist industrialization and the enormous price paid for a one-sided industrial de-
velopment .... This public reaction gave birth to the first dissident movements 
which in the late 1980s created the drive to overthrow the fossilized Commu-
nist structures allover Central and Eastern Europe. In the case of Bulgaria 
we may declare without reservation that environmental consciousness was at 
the springs of democratic consciousness. 
Emil Minchev, Introduction, in BAUMGARTL I, supra note 47, at xiii. 
As a result of the course ofthe events in Bulgaria, anyone who describes the history 
of the revolutionary transformation in Bulgaria typically relates all events to Elwglas-
nost. In fact, following the 1989 revolution Elwglasnost actually transformed into a 
political party with the greatest success of any such movement in the region. It main-
tained its ecological roots to a greater extent than many such umbrella movements as 
well, fmally abandoning political party status, and was one of the last holdouts of the 
1980s form of environmental dissident movements. The historical development of the 
environmentalist movement in Bulgaria during this period is recounted in detail in 
Bernd Baumgartl, Environmental Protest as a Vehicle for Transition: The Case of EIw-
glasnost in Bulgaria, in ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: POLICIES AND 
POLITICS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 10, at 162-70, and in 
BAUMGARTL I, supra note 47, at 50-75. 
61. See, e.g., Viktoria Szirmai, The Structural Mechanisms of the Organization of 
Ecological-Social Movements in Hungary, in ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION: POLICIES AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 10, 
at 152. 
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The second phase of the pre-revolutionary period was illus-
trated by concessions made by state power structures, which at 
the same time maintained a strict bottom line on power. 62 The 
Party tactic of trying to co-opt spontaneous formations was a 
phenomenon of the period 1987-88 in Central and Eastern 
Europe.63 This process was encouraged by the sudden devel-
opment of a constituency for environmental agencies within the 
state bureaucracies, which gave such agencies confidence in 
their dealings with the industrial interests, and in many cases 
led to their elevation to ministry-level status.64 But, these at-
tempts were coupleel with a lack of basic compromise on civic 
space. As such they did not address the underlying problems of 
democratically uncontrolled bureaucratic management, perva-
sive corruption, lack of participation, and non-identification of 
the people with the state and its purposes. This was true be-
cause underlying the official response was the desire to inhibit 
spontaneous progressive impulses among the population. 
But such state-sponsored structures did not prove flexible 
enough to embody the bulk of public agitation, as they were 
62. In Hungary, citizens who attempted to form an organization in opposition to 
the proposed siting of a low-level nuclear waste storage facility in the village of Ofalu 
were frustrated in their attempts to officially register their organization by administra-
tive and political obstacles. Typically, authorities attempted to channel activism into 
official organizations. See J. Juhasz et aI., Environmental Conflict and Political 
Change: Public Perception on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management in Hungary, 
in ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: POLICIES AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL 
AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 10, at 232. The same tactic had been used in 1984 
against the Danube Circle (Duna Kor) over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project. See 
infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra note 50. Scientific socialist regimes developed a policy of "normali-
zation" whereby "positive" elements of opposition would be co-opted into state struc-
tures in conjunction with crackdowns. See Jiri Valenta, Revolutionary Change, Soviet 
Intervention and 'Normalization' in East-Central Europe, 16 COMPo POL. 127-151 
(January 1984). In the context of the environmental movement, this phenomenon has 
been called "official environmentalism," a policy which backfired in Pol!md. In Poland 
in 1987, in the face of the growth of the Polski Klub Ekologiczny (Polish Ecological 
Club) (PKE) following Chernobyl and its increasing independence from state control 
and influence, the Polish government took the step of establishing an official organiza-
tion for environmental protection in order to try to co-opt the movement. This was the 
Ekologiczy Ruch Spoleczny, or Social Movement for Ecology (ERS). See HICKS, supra 
note 47, at 135-61 (1996) (providing an in-depth and compelling look at the dynamic 
interaction among ideology, environmental destruction, and civic opposition in the 
context of the Poland of the 1980s). With respect to Hungary, see Galambos I, supra 
note 10, at 204. 
64. See Kabala, supra note 57, at 55. 
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still tempered by and beholden to the state, and increasingly 
grassroots environmental organizations were formed. The re-
sponse to such tactics in most cases was for the targeted or-
ganization to go underground.65 Meanwhile, formerly loyal in-
stitutions increasingly found the courage to stand up to 
authority.66 Authorities were on the defensive. No one wanted 
to take responsibility for grossly unpopular decisions. On the 
contrary, environmentalists were appearing in state structures, 
leaking information to the public. "Official" publications about 
the extent of environmental degradation also came out. 67 
Regardless of whether it was a root cause, the rise of envi-
ronmentalism in the Communist Bloc coincided with the fall of 
communist and socialist governments. During the period of 
intermittently chaotic transformation that has occurred since, 
the countries in transition have grappled with problems relat-
ing to the essential restructuring of society. Among the charac-
teristics of this period are a break with tradition and an open-
ing to outside concepts. Although the transformation is far 
from complete, the economic implications of the collapse of the 
Communist Bloc and the reorientation of its states can be 
measured to some degree in terms of real wages, unemploy-
ment, GDP, black economy, etc .. 68 Such developments in an 
65. For example, in Bulgaria the efforts of the government to "legalize" the grass-
roots Committee for the Ecological Protection of the Town Ruse through its co-opting 
into the official Fatherland Front drove the organization underground. Most of its 
members soon resurfaced in Ekoglasnost. See BAUMGARI'L I, supra note 47, at 57. 
66. In the Ofalu case, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences played a pivotal role 
and through a subtle phrasing asserted its independence while reintroducing the no-
tion of scientific relativism. In their ongoing dispute with the public about the siting of 
the nuclear waste storage facility, the authorities essentially were relying on the Acad-
emy of Sciences to close ranks and uphold their determination. The Academy could not 
offer a clear scientific determination against the siting, so it took public discontent into 
account in the only way it could-by issuing an ambiguous statement-["tlhe site is not 
inappropriate"-thus sending the signal that this was a political matter and that the 
Academy refused to take sides, while at the same time giving substantial moral sup-
port to the facility's opponents. See Juhasz, supra note 62, at 233. 
67. E.g., ECOLOGICAL SECTION OF THE BIOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE STATE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1989). 
68. According to the United Nations, "[tlhe difficult restructuring required by the 
transition to a market economy, which had been carried out during the period 1989-92, 
had in most countries proved to be extremely harsh, socially costly but fundamentally 
necessary. The resulting short-term falls in incomes, production, and welfare had been 
dramatic." UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEV. UNDER 
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TRANSITION: EUROPE & CIS 9 (May 1997). The U.N. Development Program has identi-
fied six major transformations occurring in Central and Eastern Europe that are de-
termining the "potential for sustain ability of human settlements in the region.n [d. at 
18. They include: a transformation of human settlement patterns including demo-
graphic changes; economic transformations that include breakdown of previous distri-
bution systems, privatization, inflation, expansion of the shadow economy; the trans-
formation of state-civil society relations from authoritarian to democratic modes of 
governance, with variation from state to state; continuing severe environmental degra-
dation; excess demands on a deteriorating infrastructure; and transformations in social 
relations including divisions along ethnic lines, breakdown in the family, and increas-
ing social stratification. According to the report, these transformations taken together 
have a dramatic impact on the well-being of the people living in the region. [d. 
The impact of economic pressures can be shown by the following figures on trends in 
the UN Human Development Index (HDI) (an index which measures development by 
combining indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income). See id. 
HDI trends for all countries in Eastern Europe fell progressively in the period 1990 to 
1996, except for Romania, which showed a slight recovery in 1996 to 1992 levels. In 
terms of global ranking, all countries in the region fell throughout the period 1990-95, 
with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania showing slight improvements in 1996. In com-
parison to the countries of the world in 1996, all CIS countries were ranked below the 
last ranking for the Soviet Union, which was 31 in 1991. 
HDI trends, 1990.98 
Country 1990 1998 
Albania 0.79 0.633 
Belarus 0.92 0.787 
Bulgaria 0.918 0.773 
Czech Republic 0.92 0.872 
Estonia 0.92 0.749 
Hungary 0.915 0.855 
Latvia 0.92 0.82 
Lithuania 0.92 0.719 
Moldova 0.92 0.663 
Poland 0.91 0.819 
Romania 0.762 0.738 
Russian Fed 0.92 0.804 
Slovak Republic 0.92 0.864 
Ukraine 0.92 0.719 
Among the noteworthy facts from the figures presented above is the fact that in 
1996,8 out ofthe 14 countries surveyed had HDIs lower than that of Albania in 1990. 
A further gross indicator of the depth of transformation is the incidence of basic 
needs poverty in Eastern Europe. The figures for nearly all countries, with the excep-
tion of the few western-most states, increased dramatically in the period 1987 to 1994. 
The most dramatic increases have occurred in Moldova and Lithuania, in which basic 
needs poverty rose from 4% to 65% of the population, and from 1% to 49%, respectively. 
SETI'LEMENTS REPORT, supra note 39, at 81, tbl. 7.1. Meanwhile, a fundamental re-
structuring of ownership and control of the means of production was taking place. 
Whereas virtually 100% of the Soviet economy was state-controlled as late as 1991, by 
1995 more than 70% of the GDP of the Russian Federation was in private hands, com-
prising 20,000 enterprises and 100,000 small businesses. In the Czech RepUblic the 
figure was 65%, and in Estonia and Latvia it was 55%. See COMM'N ON SECURITY AND 
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, BRIEFING ON U.S. ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE AND THE NIS: AN ASSESSMENT 5 (Washington DC, 17 Feb. 1995) (statement of 
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area which is an historical crossroads of civilizations 69 may 
have global implications. 
Apart from the basic issue of stability, moreover, the impli-
cations of the "maldevelopment" under scientific socialism 
resonate for both the developing and the developed worlds and 
provide lessons towards the achievement of sustainable devel-
opment. For the developing countries, it provides a clear pic-
ture of unsustainability. For the developed world, it sheds 
light on the impact of particular deficits on longer term proc-
esses. This universal relevancy invites an examination of the 
resolution of the interests underlying the complex changes in 
Central and Eastern Europe, as useful information that might 
contribute to a better understanding of sustainable develop-
ment; 
In most countries there existed some gigantic and poten-
tially devastating central planning scheme that could be at-
tacked on purely environmental grounds but at the same time 
would bring the system into question. In Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia and other countries, nuclear power became the 
focus.70 In Russia, besides Chernobyl, Lake Baikal became a 
Thomas Dine, U.S. Agency for International Development). At the same time, trading 
patterns shifted significantly. Between 1984 and 1992, for example, the proportion of 
exports from CEE countries finding their way to markets in Western Europe doubled. 
See BAUMGARTL I, supra note 47, at 25, table. In the mid·1990s more than half of all 
exports from Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary were sent to EU countries. Finally, 
economies shifted their focus from manufacturing to mixed economies. Industrial 
production, for example, dropped an average of 39% over the period 1989·93 in seven 
countries in the CEE region. See THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE FOR CENTRAL 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 10, at 5, tbl. 1.2. 
69. Looking backward in 1932, John Dos Passos recalled the earlier part of the 
Century with the words, "the World had started spinning round Sarajevo." JOHN Dos 
PASSOS, U.S.A. 538 (1966). 
70. This gave rise to regionally·based citizen movements such as No More Cher· 
nobyls, a project of the Czech NGO, Hnuti Duha (Rainbow Movement). Hnuti Duha 
has actively protested the construction of the Temelin nuclear power plant in the Czech 
Republic. For an overview of nuclear issues in the region from the perspective of the 
No More Chernobyls network of citizens organizations throughout Central and Eastern 
Europe, see http://www.ecn.cz/private/c10/reactors.html. The Ignalina nuclear power 
plant in Lithuania and the Kozloduy nuclear power plant in Bulgaria are among the 
most dangerous in the world, according to a report by the U.S. Department of Energy. 
See OFF. OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, MOST DANGEROUS 
REACTORS (May 1995). 
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rallying point for criticism of the regime.71 Ukraine, where the 
Chemobyl disaster took place, had other significant environ-
mental rallying points as well, such as chemical contamination 
in Dniepropetrovsk. Chemical contamination was the focus of 
initial protests in Bulgaria as well. 72 A major focal point of 
these forces in Hungary and Czechoslovakia was the dispute 
over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros barrage system.73 
IV. THE DANUBE DISPUTE BETWEEN HUNGARY 
AND SLOVAKIA 
A BACKGROUND OF THE DANUBE DISPUTE 
The case arose out of a dispute between the two coWltries 
over construction and operation of a proposed series of barrages 
on the Danube River, which forms their common. border. 74 
With its roots in the Cold War era, the project for a system of 
71. See French, supra note 36, at 18. 
72. Many of the key environmental hotspots were located on international fron-
tiers, or had transboundary impacts. To some extent the scientific socialist notion of 
friendship among nations was its own undoing. The need to show international social-
ist unity cut short complaints against neighbors for siting their hazardous facilities 
along borders. As a result, many of the emerging environmental disputes in the wake 
of Chernobyl both were centered around transboundary disputes and involved incipient 
nationalism. In Hungary, it was the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros barrage system. In Bul-
garia, it was gas clouds crossing to Ruse from Giurgiu in Romania. In the Baltics it 
was -the Ignalina nuclear power plant, imposed by Moscow. These environmental 
transboundary disputes fueled the reemergence of ethnic identity and renewed nation-
alism. The rhetoric ofthe Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute is revealing. After a reformist 
Hungarian government sought to renegotiate the original 1977 Treaty in June 1989, 
the existing Czechoslovak hard line government labelled the move anti-socialist and 
accused Hungary of jeopardizing "good neighborly relations.n The Czechoslovak gov-
ernment was dominated by Slovaks at this time. See Galambos I, supra note 10, at 
183. 
73. "The fight over the Danube was like a school for politics.n Schwabach, supra 
note 3, at 297 n.48 (quoting an unnamed Duna Kor co-founder). Schwaba.ch also quotes 
Janos Vargha: "People thought that if it is possible to stop this dam, we can change the 
total system.n [d. (citation omitted). See also Judit Galambos, Political Aspects of an 
Environmental Conflict: the Case of the Gabcilrovo·Nagymaros Dam System, in J. 
KAKONEN, PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
(1992) [hereinafter Galambos Ill. 
74. Excellent studies of the facts and circumstances leading up to the case include 
JOHN FITZMAURICE, DAMMING THE DANUBE: GABCIKOVO AND POST-COMMUNIST 
POLITICS IN EUROPE (1996) and Galambos I, supra note 10. Further studies that pro-
vide factual overviews include Williams, supra note 8, Eckstein, supra note 9, and 
Galambos II, supra note 73. 
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locks to be constructed and operated in two series, one on 
Czechoslovak territory at Gabcikovo and one on Hungarian 
territory at Nagymaros,75 was designed to provide hydroelectric 
power, employ workers, tame the river against flooding and 
improve navigation. 76 A Treaty was signed in 1977 between 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia 77 to carry out the Gabcikovo-
N agymaros Project but the Project soon suffered the same fate 
as many large and unwieldy public works projects during the 
latter days of the Soviet Bloc. The financing promised from 
Moscow did not materialize,78 scientific consensus broke down 
resulting in further studies, deadlines were missed, and con-
struction suspended. 79 
In particular, conclusions about the environmental safety of 
the Project were criticized by a group of dissenting scientists in 
both countries, beginning with seismologists in Hungary. 80 
75. The barrage system project which is the subject of the dispute between Hun· 
gary and Slovakia is referred to herein as the "Gabcikovo·Nagymaros Project" or the 
"Project." 
76. Navigation has long been an issue in this section of the Danube, the only sec-
tion that is not fully navigable at all times of year. The general improvement of navi-
gability of the Danube has long been the subject of international agreement. See, e.g., 
Convention Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube, August 18, 1948, art. 
3, 33 U.N.T.S. 197 (in which the parties undertake to carry out works necessary for 
improvement of navigation conditions). While it was not part of the judgment or the 
submissions to the Court, it is believed by some that one of the original purposes of the 
Project was to provide a navigable waterway by which Soviet warships could reach 
Western Europe in the event of conflict. It is interesting to note that, had the Gabcik-
ovo-Nagymaros works been completed during the Soviet era, a majority of the Danube 
Commission (consisting of representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, 
Romania, Hungary, USSR, and Ukraine) would have had the authority to maintain 
normal navigation in that section of the Danube, even over Hungarian objections. See 
id. at 198-199, arts. 4, 5. 
77 . Treaty Concerning the Construction and· Operation of the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros System of Locks, Sept. 16 1977, Hung.-Czech. Rep. 1109 U.N.T.S. 236, 32 
LL.M. 1247 (1993) [hereinafter 1977 Treaty). Slovakia was found by the Court to be 
the successor state to Czechoslovakia. 
78. Hungary proposed to Czechoslovakia that the latter take over full fmancial re-
sponsibility for construction during a period of financial difficulties in 1981. While 
Czechoslovakia agreed to a delay, Hungary was finaliy forced to tum to Austria for 
financing. See Galambos II, supra note 73, at 80-81. Ultimately, Hungary paid com-
pensation to the Austrian firms involved. See Schwabach, supra note 3, at 297. 
79. By Protocol to the 1977 Treaty signed on Oct. 10 1983, the Parties agreed to 
postpone construction for four years. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 180, para. 30. 
80. [d. at 180, para. 32. The threat of earthquakes, while not playing a role in 
Hungary's representations in the case, was part of the rhetoric of citizens organizations 
in the 1988-1992 period. See, e.g., DANUBE DEFENSE ACTION COMMI'ITEE, THE DANUBE 
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While scientific conjectures against the Project were expressed 
even prior to the signing of the 1977 Treaty, these opinions had 
been routinely suppressed. However, beginning in 1980, scien-
tific opposition increased and an attempt was made by oppos-
ing interests to organize. These attempts were frustrated. 81 
Even when the Academy of Sciences joined the scientific oppo-
sition, political controls continued to be imposed and restric-
tions were placed on the Academy of Sciences.82 In January 
1984, an ad hoc group, precursor to the Duna Kor (Danube Cir-
cle), was formed. 83 This group attempted to register as a public 
organization two years later, but registration was refused on 
the grounds that an official organization for coordinating public 
opinion on environmental matters already existed. 84 
The persistence of the dissident scientists began to attract 
public attention. The movement established to oppose the con-
struction of the dam at N agymaros in Hungary was able to 
muster 10,000 signatures on a petition in 1984.85 But in early 
1986, with the government's decision to go ahead with con-
struction using Austrian fmancing, the movement had 
faltered. 86 One year later, following the Chernobyl nuclear ac-
BLUES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE BOs (GABCIKOVO)-NAGYMAROS Hy-
DROELECTRIC STATION SYSTEM 3, 4 (October 1992) [hereinafter "DANUBE BLUES"). 
Compare Williams, supra note 8, at 30 ("scientists and hydrologists"). 
81. See, e.g., DANUBE BLUES, supra note 80, at 5. (noting that any viewpoint other 
than those in favor of "gigantic technical establishments" was subordinated, and that 
"the communist dictatorship silenced the protests of its scientists"). 
82. Scientists at the Slovak Academy of Sciences also spoke out against the dams. 
See id. at 5. 
83. See Galambos I, supra note 10, at 180. 
84. The frustration of the dissident scientists by a decision making process that 
was rigid and inherently skewed towards particular interests may be compared to the 
"under-critical" model of decision making discussed in DAVID COLLINGRIDGE & COLIN 
REEVE, SCIENCE SPEAKS TO POWER 33-34 (1986). According to this model, a policy 
consensus is set by the bureaucracy. Scientific conjecture that threatens the policy 
consensus is suppressed, while scientific conjecture that fits the policy consensus goes 
uncriticized. "Science," thus, perpetuates policy in a feedback loop and acts in the 
service of the bureaucrats. Criticism of the policy inherently must take on "science" as 
well. When the policy consensus breaks down, however, the scientific consensus is 
shown to be illusory. The under-critical model of decision making is especially likely in 
the case of colossal, complex projects relying upon inflexible technological solutions. 
Such projects cannot proceed without large-scale mobilization, which in tum requires 
centralization and solid consensus. 
85. See Galambos I, supra note 10, at 180-183. 
86. See id. at 181. 
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cident, the picture had rotated 180 degrees. 87 Dam opponents 
held small demonstrations that were broken up by the police. 
By 1988, the environmentalist opposition to N agymaros had re-
formed in far greater numbers and was able to convince a 
group of independent legislators (some had been elected in the 
1985 elections) to seek a referendum on further construction. 
Conservative forces prevailed, however, and the Parliament 
reconfirmed the Project that year. The fIrst mass demonstra-
tion against the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project occurred in the 
Fall of 1988, involving 30,000 people, and a petition drive was 
started. 88 
The growing popularity of the environmental movement 
played into the hands of intra-Party rivalry. In Hungary, re-
form communists had battled orthodox communists for years. 
The rise of popular dissent gave ammunition to the 
reformists.89 Hungary, thus, succeeded before many of its 
neighbors to unseat the conservatives, raising Miklos Nemeth 
to party leader in November 1988.90 Such a phenomenon did 
not occur in countries such as Czechoslovakia, where internal 
party dissension was almost non-existent and hard-liners re-
mained in power to the end. It was during this time, at the 
peak of political developments, that Hungary fIrst held that 
scientillc studies on the dam were necessary. During a par-
ticularly fluid period, the official positions of the two countries 
were nearly indeterminable as political hierarchies broke 
down. The appointment of Nemeth to the post of Prime Minis-
ter in December 1988 opened the door to the establishment of a 
87. The role of the Chernobyl disaster in activating the public in Hungary is con· 
firmed in Juhasz, supra note 62, at 230·231: "In the fall of 1987, news about the siting 
of a nuclear waste storage facility leaked out. This happened a year after the Cherno· 
byl accident and nuclear danger was very much alive in public opinion." Id. Galambos 
notes: ·Starting in 1988 the political climate changed and opposition was revitalized." 
Galambos I, supra note 10, at 181. 
88. But see GABCIKOVo·NAGYMAROS: ENVIRONMENT AND RIVER DAMS 31·32 (Imre 
Dosztanyi ed., 1988) (arguing that the public had involvement in "and control over" the 
project through public discussions beginning in 1976, and giving examples of changes 
made to the plans in response to public comments). 
89. See Galambos I, supra note 10, at 218. 
90. Jackson Diehl, Hungary Names Economist ·Premier, He Puts Stress on Role of 
Legislature, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1988, at A41. 
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Committee of Independent Experts.91 Nemeth did succeed in 
identifying the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project with the hard-
liners in the popular mind, but this was too little too late. He 
could not count on the fact that the dissatisfaction of the public 
went beyond any particular regime but to the moral founda-
tions of the system itself. But Nemeth did not enjoy frill loyalty 
and support within the Party during those chaotic times, and 
conservative forces in Hungary maneuvered a decision to actu-
ally speed up the completion of the project.92 
By April 1989 a petition of more than 140,000 signatures in 
opposition to the dam was ready to be presented to the gov-
ernment.93 As public opinion coalesced into firm opposition to 
the project, and the prospect of free elections became more real, 
Hungary's government resolved, on May 13, 1989, to suspend 
the work at N agymaros in Hungarian territory pending "fur-
ther studies. »94 Meanwhile, the works on the Czechoslovak side 
of the border were well advanced. The Czechoslovak govern-
ment protested the Hungarian action and attempts at diplo-
matic settlement proved fruitless. Hungary's position evolved 
into an offer to renegotiate the 1977 Treaty as a project cover-
ing only the Gabcikovo works, with a view towards reducing 
the ecological risks associated with implementation of the 
scheme in the Gabcikovo sector.95 Meanwhile it had addition-
ally suspended the work for the diversion of the Danube at Du-
nakiliti. Czechoslovakia, for its part, offered to negotiate a 
comprehensive technical, operational and ecological set of 
guarantees for the whole Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, in-
cluding the possibility of abandonment of peak power produc-
91. This Academy of Sciences Commission, led by Peter Hardi, issued the HARDl 
REPORT in October 1989, calling for reassessment of the project. ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 
COMM'N, HARDl REPORT (1989). 
92. Internal divisions continued to plague Hungary throughout the dispute. See, 
e.g., OPPORTUNITIES FOR SZIGETKOZ: SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH 
DONE BY ISTER IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE OF THE ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCE 2 (1992) ("The inconclusive, contradictory foreign-international policy of the 
Hungarian government-itself divided on the issue-had been unable to prevent [im~ 
plementation of Variant C."). 
93. See Galambos I, supra note 10, at 183. 
94. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 26, paras. 31, 33. 
95. See id. at 181, para 37. 
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tion,96 but only if Hungary would resume work for the diversion 
at Dunakiliti.97 It was also during these negotiations, in Octo-
ber 1989, that Czechoslovakia threatened for the first time to 
implement the ''provisional solution, "98 according to which it 
would unilaterally divert the Danube to its own territory if 
Hungary failed to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty. On 
October 27, 1989, Hungary abandoned construction of the bar-
rage at Nagymaros.99 Early in November Hungary put forward 
a draft substitute treaty incorporating its proposals for aban-
donment of the N agymaros works and completion of Gabcikovo 
without peak power production. loo It also offered to re-start 
construction at Dunakiliti provided the other issues were re~ 
solved. Finally, Hungary for the first time made reference to 
the possibility of recourse to an arbitral tribunal or the Inter-
national Court of Justice to resolve any continuing disputes. 101 
Yet, the government still fell shortly thereafter. 102 
96. According to the original design the N agymaros barrage was intended to func· 
tion as a regulating barrier to modify the effects of operation of the Gabcikovo dam 
during periods of peak power production. If peak power production were to be given 
up, Nagymaros would not be necessary. Conversely, without Nagymaros, peak power 
producton at Gabcikovo would result in intolerable disruption to river flow. 
97. See id. 
98. This plan for completion of the Project is referred to as the "Provisional Solu· 
tion" or "Variant C." Variant C was included among 8 possible solutions presented by a 
Slovakian consulting fIrm and was the only one that did not require Hungarian coop· 
eration. For a discussion of the signmcance of the terminology, see infra notes 153-
156 and accompanying text. 
99. .This was done by a resolution of the government. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 
181, para. 37. The fact that the parliament was under full government control was 
reflected by its seesawing on the issue of the dam in lockstep with the government's 
changes of position. In October 1988 it had confIrmed the project, and in June 1989 it 
accepted the government's proposal to try to renegotiate the 1977 Treaty with Czecho-
slovakia. The parliament, as well as the government, may have been influenced by 
growing public confIdence. After the October 1988 parliamentary debate on Nagyma-
ros-the fIrst session of parliament televised in Hungary-dtizens started to collect 
signatures to recall representatives who particularly distinguished themselves in ap-
paratchik fashion. See Galambos I, supra note 10, at 204. See also DANUBE BLUES, 
supra note 80, at 6 (referring to powerful and influential groups entrenched in the state 
bureaucracy interested in pursuing the project who obstructed the carrying out of offi-
cial Hungarian policy both inside and outside Hungary). Note the similarity to events 
in Hungary in 1997-98 following the ICJ decision, discussed infra at notes 235-238 and 
accompanying text. 
100. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 181, para. 37. 
101. See id. 
102. This was part of a phenomenon found in other parts of the region as well. In 
Poland, Solidarity and the PKE sat together at the historic "round table" in early 1989 
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After 1989, with former oppositions firmly in power in both 
countries, the national positions became more clear. The Gab-
cikovo-Nagymaros Project came to symbolize quite different 
things to the various power structures within each country. 
The Czechoslovak position became more and more dominated 
by the Slovaks, while the Czechs distanced themselves. The 
Czech view was crystallized by Vaclav Havel, then President of 
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, who in 1991 called the 
project a "totalitarian, gigomaniac monument which is against 
nature."I03 For Slovakia, however, the project attained exag-
gerated importance as a symbol of its new independence, and 
became associated with achievement and solidarity.l04 While 
across the border in Hungary, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros was a 
rallying point for the opposition, which considered it to be an 
ecologically malicious manifestation of foreign domina.tion. I05 
when negotiations for an end to communist party rule were held, and environmental 
issues were a part of the demands made. See HICKS, supra note 47, at 122-34. In Bul-
garia, the government crumbled in the face of institutional challenges mounted by 
Ekoglasnost. See BAUMGARTL I, supra note 47. 
103. See supra note10. 
104. See FITZMAURICE, supra note 74, at 73 
105. Thus, the dispute involved elements of environmentalism as well as national-
ism on all sides. See supra note 72. On the link between environmental issues, na-
tionalism, and the rights of minorities, see generally Human Rights and the ETWiron-
ment, U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/199419 (July 6, 1994). In the context of the present case, some commen-
tators have focused on the ethnic or nationalist elements. For a deep, if disjointed, 
analysis laying primary blame for the dispute on Hungarian nationalism, see EGIL 
LEJON, GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS: OLD AND NEW SINS (Martin Urbancik & Thomas Grey 
trans., 1996). For a Slovakian view of Hungarian nationalism surrounding the dam 
dispute that illustrates the complexity of the problem, see MIROSLAV B. LISKA, 
HYDROELECTRIC SYSTEM GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS: DEVEWPMENT OF THE SLOVAK-
HUNGARIAN SECTION OF THE DANUBE (1995). Liska provides food for thought: 
[P)opulistic arguments were "enriched" ... by a national dimension. N agyma-
ros was said to "spoil the view on the Danube bend at Visegrad; considered to 
be a "national heritage." Austrians were accused of eco-exploitation of neigh-
bouring countries and Slovaks of an attempt to separate Hungarians living 
along the Danube and to concretize the borders, i.e., to fix the border defi-
nitely in the Danube bed, according to the decision ofthe Trianon peace treaty 
of 1920. This is still .considered by many Hungarians as forced upon their 
country, reducing Hungary significantly in size and significance, after the fall 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
The borderline in a region of mixed-population was drawn so that about 
an equal number of 400 thousand Slovaks remained in Hungary and Hungari-
ans in Slovakia. After a half-century, during which the Hungarian army occu-
pied the south of Slovakia three times, the number of Slovaks in Hungary fell 
to about 10 thousand, while the number of Hungarians in Slovakia grew to 
over 560 thousand. But illogically, the Slovaks were accused of an attempt to 
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Hungary adopted a resolution in late 1990 calling for nego-
tiation with Czechoslovakia with an end towards termination 
of the Treaty by mutual consent. 106 Also in 1990 plans for the 
provisional solution-now called "Variant C"-began to move 
ahead. In March 1991, when Hungary learned that planning of 
Variant C had moved substantially ahead, it expressed alarm 
and began to call for suspension of works on the Czechoslovak 
side as a condition for further negotiations. 107 Czechoslovakia 
initially responded by proposing four alternatives, each of 
which would require Hungarian cooperation, while also calling 
for establishment of a tripartite commission, together with the 
European Communities, to examine technical issues. 108 In par-
allel, the Hungarian Parliament issued a resolution directing 
the government to enter negotiations for the purpose of termi-
nating the 1977 Treaty and to negotiate a new agreement con-. 
ceming the consequences of abandonment, including efforts at 
assimilate the Hungarians. As the 1977 Treaty contains a voluntarily signed 
confirmation of the Trianon border line, some groups of Hungarians (not large 
but loud) strived to abrogate it by all possible means, cost what cost. 
[d. at 5. 
It is obvious from the foregoing that Liska considers Hungary's participation in the 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in response to the 1968 "Prague Spring" to be 
a Hungarian military occupation of Southern Slovakia. See also Schwabach, supra 
note 3, at 303 n.92 (pointing to Czech nationalism as the root cause of inevitable ethnic 
conflict between Slovaks and Hungarians in the Danube border region, and contra-
dicting Liska's population figures); Williams, supra note 8, at 5·6 (noting that Czecho-
slovakia settled large numbers of Slovaks in the area around Gabcikovo in the post-
War period to deter secessionist tendencies, and that after WWII a one-to-one repatria-
tion of Hungarians and Slovaks took place, but over 750,000 Hungarians remained in 
Czechoslovakia because there were substantially more Hungarians there than Slovaks 
in Hungary). For the proposition that the government in Slovakia has routinely 
blamed internal opposition to the Project on the Hungarian minority, see Schwabach, 
supra note 3, at 304. With respect to Austria's role in the project, see id., at 297,326 n. 
254 (citing LISKA, for the proposition that compensation for environmental damage 
done by Austria to the Bratislava region was one reason Slovakia felt Variant C was 
necessary). For a Hungarian pro·dam view that blamed internal Hungarian politics 
and individual political ambitions for Hungarian official opposition to the dam, see 
Miklos Kozak, Gabcikovo as the Trojan Horse for a Change of Power in Hungary, 4 
EUROPA VINCET 28, 29-32 (1993), cited in Eckstein, supra note 9, at 100-101 n.137; 
DANUBE BLUES, supra note 80, at 8 (warning the public against placing nationalistic 
interpretations on the dispute). 
106. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 182, par. 39. 
107. In the meantime, Slovakian, Hungarian, Austrian and other environmental 
activists demonstrated at the construction site, at times bringing construction to a halt. 
See Schwabach, supra note 3, at 300. 
108. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 187, para. 62. 
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rehabilitation. 109 Shortly thereafter, however, in July, in re-
sponse to a letter from Hungary to the Prime Minister of the 
constituent Slovak Republic, the latter informed Hungary that 
a decision had been made by the Slovak Government and the 
Czechoslovakian Government to implement the provisional 
solution, "aimed at the commencement of operations on the ter-
ritory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.» 110 Construc-
tion of a dam to divert the Danube at Cunovo in Czechoslovak 
territory commenced in November 1991. In December the par-
ties met and agreed to form an expert committee with partici-
pation of the European Communities. III But, the parties were 
in fundamental and irreconcilable disagreement on the timing 
of events, as Hungary required an immediate suspension of 
construction on Variant C, while Czechoslovakia offered only to 
suspend construction after the committee made its fmdings.112 
This deadlock-in which Slovakia played an increasing role in 
anticipation of its imminent independence 113-continued 
through 1992 as construction on Variant C continued. As the 
diversion of the Danube loomed-scheduled for October-Hun-
gary attempted to terminate the Treaty unilaterally by Note 
Verbale, effective 25 May 1992.114 
109. See Application of Hungary, at 3. 
110. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 187·188, para. 63. 
111. See id. at 188, para. 64. 
112. See id. 
113. Most Czechoslovak decisions related to the project were obviously engineered 
by Slovakian forces. As construction proceeded, Czech opposition increased, until the 
time of the decision to divert the Danube in October 1992. Three days after the begin-
ning of the diversion of the Danube at a meeting of ministers of Czechoslovakia the 
ministers split 5-5 strictly along ethnic lines on a resolution to halt diversion of the 
river pending the outcome of the European Community Commission's study, causing 
the Czechoslovakian government to come "near to collapse." Schwabach, supra note 3 
at 301; Eckstein, supra note 9, at 100 n.135. Czech and Slovak disagreement over the 
dam had earlier played a role in the elections in 1992 that led to the inevitability of the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia. 
114. See Declaration of the Government of the Republic of Hungary on. the termina-
tion of the Treaty Concluded Between the People's Republic of Hungary and the So-
cialist Republic of Czechoslovakia on the Construction and Joint Operation of the Gab-
cikovo-Nagymaros Barrage System, May 16 1992,32 I.L.M. 1259 (1993). 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss3/2
1999] DANUBE DEVELOPMENT 347 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
On October 23, 1992 the diversion of the Danube began. 115 
On the same date Hungary filed a petition before the ICJ, 
while acknowledging Czechoslovakia had not consented to the 
jurisdiction of the Court. A last ditch effort by the European 
Communities to initiate tripartite negotiations and commission 
a study proved ineffectual. The Parties (with Slovakia substi-
tuted for Czechoslovakia) fmally submitted the case to the ICJ 
by mutual agreement in April 1993. On July 2, 1993 by joint 
notification addressed to the registrar of the ICJ, the two par-
ties submitted a Special Agreement for submission of the dis-
pute to the Court. 116 
The questions presented to the Court included: (1) whether 
Hungary was entitled in 1989 to suspend and then abandon 
construction of works it was responsible for under the Treaty; 
(2) whether Czechoslovakia was entitled to proceed to construct 
the provisional solution in 1991 and then to implement the 
provisional solution in October 1992; and (3) what was the ef-
fect of Hungary's notice of termination of the Treaty in May 
1992. The Court was also requested to determine the legal 
consequences, including the rights and obligations of the Par-
ties, arising out of its judgment with respect to the questions 
presented. 117 
115. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 188, para. 65. 
116. Special Agreement for Submission to the International Court of Justice of Dif-
ferences Concerning the Gabcikovo-N agymaros Project, April 7, 1993, Hung-Slovk., 32 
I.L.M. 1293 exchange of instruments of ratification June 28, 1993 [hereinafter Special 
Agreement). 
117. [d. art. 2. Article 2 provides in full: 
(1) The Court is requested to decide on the basis of the Treaty and rules and 
principles of general international law, as well as such other treaties as the 
Court may find applicable, 
(a) whether the Republic of Hungary was entitled to suspend and subse-
quently abandon, in 1989, the works on the Nagymaros Project and on the 
part of the Gabcikovo Project for which the Treaty attributed responsibility to 
the Republic of Hungary; 
(b) whether the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was entitled to proceed, 
in November 1991, to the "provisional solution" and to put into operation from 
October 1992 this system, described in the Report of the Working Group of In-
dependent Experts of the Commission of the European Communities, the Re-
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C. ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA118 
In its pleadings and arguments before the Court, Hungary 
contended, with respect to the first question, that Czechoslova-
kia did not respond to Hungary's reasonable envu'onmental 
concerns, giving rise to a state of "ecological necessity" requir-
ing abandonment of construction at Nagymaros. Furthermore, 
Hungary contended that the 1977 Treaty was a framework 
agreement with a general goal of creating a barrage system on 
the Danube, which did not specifically require the building of a 
dam at N agymaros. For this reason, the abandonment may 
have been contrary to the Joint Contractual Plan119 according to 
which the treaty obligations were to be carried out, but not the 
Treaty itself. 
Concerning the construction of Variant C, Hungary con-
tended that the unilateral diversion of the Danube by Czecho-
slovakia was a violation of Hungarian sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity.12O Hungary also asserted the applicability of the 
precautionary principle against the unilateral and unconsid-
ered implementation of Variant C,121 pointing to Czechoslova-
kia's obligations under the 1977 Treaty, other legal instru-
public of Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic dated 23 No· 
vember 1992 (damming up of the Danube at river kilometre 1851.7 on Czecho-
slovak territory and resulting consequences on water and navigation ('.ourse); 
(c) what are the legal effects of the notification, on 19 May 1992, of the ter-
mination of the Treaty by the RepUblic of Hungary. 
(2) The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences, in-
cluding the rights and obligations for the Parties, arising from its Judgment 
on the questions in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
118. Not all arguments made by the Parties or discussed by the Court are consid-
ered here. For example, the Court discussed the substitution of Slovakia as a Party in 
place of Czechoslovakia, an issue that was heavily contested by Hungary. 
119. The Joint Contractual Plan actually predated the 1977 Treaty, as it was cre-
ated under the Agreement Between the Government of the Hungarian People's Repub-
lic and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Concerning the Drafting 
of a Joint Contractual Plan for the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks. See 1977 
Treaty, supra note 77, art. 1.4, 1109 U.N.T.S. at 237, 32 I.L.M. 1250. Article 4.1 of the 
1977 Treaty provides that the project shall be carried out in conformity with the Joint 
Contractual Plan. Id. at 238. The Joint Contractual Plan played an important role in 
many aspects of the Court's decision. Note that Hungary declined to consider the Joint 
Contractual Plan as a "related instrument" under the Special Agreement, because it 
wanted to minimize the Plan's legal effect. See JudgTrumt, 37 I.L.M. at 179, para. 26. 
120. See Application of Hungary, at 8.00 
121. See id. at 10-11. 
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ments, and customary international law pertaining to trans-
boundary watercourses. 
Hungary also argued that its attempt at termination of the 
1977 Treaty in 1992 was effective. Hungary's justification for 
termination lay on several grounds, including impossibility of 
performance, permanent disappearance or destruction of an 
"object" indispensable for execution, and fundamental changed 
circumstances, ~onsisting of political and economic changes, 122 
as well as changes in the state of environmental knowledge and 
environmental law. Hungary also pointed out that its action 
took place in the face of Czechoslovakia's imminent diversion of 
the Danube, which was evidence of the latter's bad faith. 
Slovakia argued that Hungary's abandonment of construc-
tion of the works at N agymaros was a material breach of the 
1977 Treaty. Further, in the face of this material breach and 
the immense investment made in the Czechoslovakian part of 
the Project, Czechoslovakia had no choice but to proceed to the 
Provisional Solution as an approximate application of the 
Treaty. Alternatively, this action could be justified as a lawful 
countermeasure brought about by Hungary's breach. With re-
spect to the environmental arguments made by Hungary, Slo-
vakia argued that it had negotiated in good faith based on the 
Treaty, that the project actually had environmental benefits, 123 
122. It is interesting to note that the case was begun at a time when the govern-
ment was led by the Communist-era opposition, but by the time the argument of 
changed circumstances was made before the ICJ, a government made up of the former 
reform communists was in power. It is not clear whether the ousting of the former 
rightist opposition in the Hungarian elections of 1994 had any influence on either the 
content or the persuasiveness of the part of Hungary's argument based on political and 
economic changes. However, a government led by the former opposition might more 
forcefully make the argument that the 1989 transformations were in essence a reat-
tainment of sovereignty after a period of heavy foreign domination. The return of the 
Socialists to power, thus, coincided with a less convincing and less strongly prosecuted 
argument of fundamentally changed circumstances as a grounds for abandonment of 
the treaty that relied more upon economic collapse than upon removal of political 
domination. In its decision, the ICJ alluded to the inflexible situation at hand at the 
time of the signing ofthe treaties in 1977, when it pointed out that "these texts did not 
envisage the possibility of the signatories unilaterally suspending or abandoning the 
work provided for therein, or even carrying it out according to a new schedule not ap-
proved by the two partners." Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 182, para. 39. 
123. See also LISKA, supra note 105, at 11-16 (propounding the Provisional Solu-
tion's positive impacts on erosion, accessibility of the Bratislava harbor, flow of the 
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and that the only rational means of preventing further envi-
ronmental damage was to proceed to full implementation of the 
original scheme. 
Both Parties sought declarations from the Court concerning 
their rights to compensation from the other Party. Hungary, 
moreover, asked for a declaration by the Court that operation 
of the Gabcikovo works should be halted and the full volume of 
the Danube returned to its original course in integrum restitu-
tio, while Slovakia asked for the Court to order Hungary to per-
form its obligations under the original Treaty and to enter into 
negotiations with Slovakia concerning the modalities thereof. 
v. JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 
A. HUNGARY WAS NOT ENTITLED To SUSPEND AND 
ABANDON WORKS AT NAGYMAROS 
The Court determined, fIrst, that Hungary was not entitled 
to suspend and abandon construction of the works it was re-
sponsible for under the Treaty,124 upholding the rule of pacta 
sunt servanda,l25 and rejecting Hungary's argument of a "state 
of ecological necessity." With respect to whether the abandon-
ment might be consistent with the 1977 Treaty, the Court de-
termined that the particular works were an inseparable part of 
the "single and indivisible" system of works. 126 In examining 
the law of necessity,l27 the Court had no difficulty determining 
Maly and Mosoni Danubes, agricultural productivity, and conditions of aquatic life and 
wildlife, while minimizing potential negative impacts on quality of ground and surface 
waters). Liska further states that "[tlhe monitoring results prove that, after imple· 
mentation of proper measures, the resulting environmental impacts [of the Provisional 
Solutionl are prevailingly beneficial." [d. at 18. 
124. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 187, para. 59. 
125. Pacta sunt servanda is a maxim of customary international law also found in 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 
V.N.T.S.331. This maxim was applied to the 1977 Treaty as a matter of customary 
international law, as the parties had not ratified the 1969 Vienna Convention at the 
time of entry into force of the 1977 Treaty. 
126. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 184, para. 48. 
127. The Court was guided by Article 33 of the Draft Articles on the International 
Responsibility of States, Y.B. INT'L L. C. Vol. II, Part 2, at 34 (1980), which states: 
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that the ecological dangers complained of related to an essen-
tial interest of Hungary.l28 However, the Court held that the 
danger to the environment was not imminent, and that it was 
still possible in 1989 for a technical solution, albeit a more 
costly one, to be arrived at. l29 The Court reached its conclusion 
that there was no imminent threat to the environment in Hun-
gary, while at the same time abstaining from evaluating the 
merits of the scientific evidence, determining that "it is not 
necessary ... for [the Court] to determine which of those points 
of view is scientifically better founded. "130 Thus, Hungary was 
found to have been in breach of the 1977 Treaty by suspending 
and subsequently abandoning construction of the works on the 
Hungarian side ofthe border. 
B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF V AR1ANT C WAS 
ILLEGAL 
Next the Court considered the provisional solution-Variant 
C-and determined that it was outside the limits of the Treaty 
and could not, as Slovakia contended, be an approximate appli-
cation of the Treaty made justifiable by Hungary's abandon-
ment.13l The Court again pointed to the provisions in the 
Treaty which contemplated a joint investment constituting a 
single and indivisible operational system of works, and found 
1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for pre· 
cluding the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an in-
ternational obligation ofthe State unless: 
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the 
State against a grave and imminent peril; and 
(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State to-
wards which the obligation existed. 
2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a 
ground for precluding wrongfulness: 
(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in 
conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international law; or 
(b) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in 
conformity is laid down by a treaty which, explicitly or implicitly, excludes the 
possibility of invoking the state of necessity with respect to that obligation; or 
(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state of 
necessity. 
Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 184, para. 50. 
128. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 183, para. 53. 
129. See id. at 185, para. 55. 
130. Id. at 191, para. 54. See also Stec & Eckstein, supra note 13, at 43. 
131. See id. at 190, para. 78. The Court has applied the doctrine of approximate 
application in Admissibility of Hearings in South West Africa Case, 1956 I.C.J. 6. 
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that Variant C did not meet that requirement. As Variant C 
was outside the limits of the Treaty, the Court looked to cus-
tomary international law to assess the consequences of the di-
version of the Danube by Slovakia. Applying the equitable use 
doctrine,132 the Court held that the unilateral diversion of the 
Danube was a transgression of international law. rrhe "inal-
ienable right" to an equitable and reasonable sharing of an in-
ternational watercourse could not be forfeited by Hungary's 
failure to meet its legal obligations under the 1977 Treaty. The 
Court further rejected Slovakia's argument that Variant C was 
a lawful countermeasure for Hungary's material breach, hold-
ing that the unilateral diversion of the Danube was not propor-
tional. l33 The Court did not consider the arguments of the Par-
ties as to the balancing of interests in connection with the Proj-
ect. 
C. THE UNDERLYING TREATY IS STILL IN EFFECT 
Next, the Court held that Hungary's notification of termina-
tion of the Treaty in May 1992 was ineffective and that the 
Treaty, thus, remained in force. l34 The Court rejected Hun-
gary's various arguments justifying its termination:. Articles 
15, 19 and 20 of the Treatyl35 played an important role in the 
Court's decision in this regard. These articles, pertaining to 
protection of nature, fisheries, and the quality of the Danube, 
in the Court's words, "actually made available to the parties 
132. See discussion, infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text. 
133. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 191, para. 87. Following Hungary's material 
breach of the 1977 Treaty by suspending and abandoning the works at N agymaroB in 
1989, Czechoslovakia might have terminated the Treaty and sought reparations. 
134. See id. at 197, para. 115. 
135. 1977 Treaty, supra note 77, arts. 15,19,20 at 1109 U.N.T.S. 244-245, 321.L.M 
1255-1256 !hereinafter the Magic Articlesl. Article 15 of the Treaty specifies that the 
parties "shall ensure, by the means specified in the joint contractual plan, that the 
quality of the water in the Danube is not impaired as a result of the collstruction and 
operation of the System of Locks." ld. 1109 U.N.T.S at 244, 32 I.L.M. at 1255. Article 
19 provides that "[tlhe Contracting Parties shall, through the means specified in the 
joint contractual plan, ensure compliance with the obligations for the protection of 
nature arising in connection with the construction and operation of the System of 
Locks." ld. 1109 U.N.T.S. at 245, 32 I.L.M. at 1256. Article 20 contains similar provi-
sions relating to protection of fisheries and incorporates by reference the Convention 
concerning Fishing in the Waters of the Danube, signed at Bucharest on Jan. 29, 1958. 
ld. 1109 U.N .T.S. at 245, 32 I.L.M. at 1256. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 176, para. 18. 
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the necessary means to proceed at any time, by negotiation, to 
the required readjustments between economic imperatives and 
ecological imperatives,"I36 through reference to the Joint Con-
tractual Plan, according to which all measures for implementa-
tion of the Treaty would be carried out. These articles in the 
Court's view were designed to accommodate change and re-
flected the understanding in 1977 that the implementation of 
the Treaty might need to take into account new developments 
in the state of environmental knowledge. 137 As to Hungary's 
argument that these very provisions were violated by Czecho-
slovakia by not negotiating in good faith to adapt the Joint 
Contractual Plan to new scientific and legal developments re-
garding the environment, the Court found as a factual matter 
that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Czecho-
slovakia consistently refused to negotiate on this account. 138 
On the contrary, the Court found that Hungary's refusal to 
countenance further construction pending negotiations con-
tributed to the failure of the negotiations. Not even substantial 
progress towards the implementation of the Provisional Solu-
tion was found to be a material breach justifying termination. 
Finally, the Court considered Hungary's argument that it 
could terminate the Treaty based on new developments of in-
ternationallaw that rendered impossible the Treaty's perform-
ance. Hungary did not contend that new peremptory norms of 
environmental law had emerged since the entry into force of 
the Treaty. Nonetheless, the Court specifically noted that 
"newly developed norms of environmental law are relevant for 
the implementation of the Treaty.nI39 At this point, the Court 
left open whether this was due only to the operation of the 
Magic Articles, or to a more general obligation of international 
environmental law. However, in explaining the rights and ob-
ligations of the parties arising out of the Court's judgment, the 
Court stated more clearly its opinion that "new [environ-
136. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 194, para. 103. 
137. See id. at 195, para. 104. 
138. See id. at 196, para. 107. 
139. [d. at 196, par. 112. Hungary had argued in its Counter·Memorial that Arti· 
cles 15 and 19 of the 1977 Treaty imported into the Treaty regime international law 
rules in force at any time during the whole lifetime of the system of locks. Counter-
Memorial of the Republic of Hungary, para. 4.21. 
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mental] norms have to be taken into consideration, and ... new 
standards given proper weight, not only when States contem-
plate new activities but also when continuing with activities 
begun in the past. "140 Although the Magic Articles are again 
referred to in this Paragraph of the Judgment, the Court took 
pains to point to a different source for this rule - that is, the 
concept of sustainable development. 
Applying the concept of sustainable development to this 
case, the Court held that the parties should ''look afresh" at the 
environmental impacts of the operation of the Gabcikovo power 
plant, with particular attention to the quantities of water to be 
released to the old bed of the Danube and its side-arms. This 
particular part of the Court's judgment appears to rely heavily 
on the concept announced in the Separate Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry which he calls the "Principle of Continuing Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment" (discussed below). 
Beyond the suggestion concerning water volume, ultimately 
the Court refrained from deciding what impact such newly de-
veloped norms might have on the project, only acknowledging 
that the parties had very different ideas about it. The Court 
urged flexibility and suggested third-party involvement, pre-
sumably along the lines of the earlier initiatives in which the 
European Communities participated. 141 
The Court avoided a deep discussion of fundamental 
changed circumstances. Relying on Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties,142 it dismissed these argu-
140. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 201, para. 140. Thus, it might be concluded that envi-
ronmental matters have the quality of being by definition evolutionary, in common 
with the "sacred trust" in the Namibia case. See Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276, 1971I.C.J 16 (Advisory Opinion). 
141. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 196, para. 113. 
142. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 125, art. 62 at 347. Ar-
ticle 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides: 
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with re-
gard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was 
not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from the treaty unless: 
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the 
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 
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ments on the grounds that a joint investment project such as 
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project was not sufficiently linked to 
prevalent political conditions, and that in any event the Magic 
Articles provided an entry point for relevant changed circum-
stances. l43 Thus, where the Court stepped outside the Treaty it 
did so only to provide a more clear understanding of the signifi-
cance of the environmental concerns so generally referred to in 
the Magic Articles. 
D. THE COURT's DIRECTIONS TO THE PARTIES 
The Court also spelled out the practical implications of its 
decision. While announcing that the concept of sustainable 
development required the parties to continually assess envi-
ronmental impacts of the Project, the Court pointed to the 
Magic Articles as a means for the parties to take new environ-
mental norms and standards into consideration. H4 Specifically, 
these articles placed upon the parties a continuing and evolv-
ing obligation to maintain water quality and to protect nature. 
Furthermore, while the parties must negotiate in order to meet 
the objectives of the 1977 Treaty, the Court noted that the par-
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations 
still to be performed under the treaty. 
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground 
for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: 
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or 
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party in· 
voking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international 
obligation owed to any other party to the treaty. 
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental 
change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a 
treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation 
of the treaty. 
One commentator made the case for Hungary thusly: "Although the mere change of 
government does not amount to a fundamental change of circumstances that would 
justifY the termination of a treaty, the circumstances here are such that the entire form 
of government has been changed from a totalitarian regime based on the principles of 
Soviet communism to a democratic regime based on the principles of liberal democracy. 
Williams, supra note 8, at 31 n.166. Williams concluded that the new government 
could not ignore domestic opposition to the project as its predecessor had. 
143. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 195, para. 104. See also Stec & Eckstein, supra 
note 13, at 43 ("[E)ven though the project arose largely out of Cold War interests and 
the assumptions behind it were profoundly affected by loss of Soviet patronage, the 
shift. to a market economy, democratization, geopolitical developments, and improved 
environmental awareness, the Court made every effort to resolve the dispute within 
the confines of the 1977 Treaty and related documents:"). 
144. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 196,200. 
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ties acknowledged the specific terms of the Treaty to be nego-
tiable, thereby implying a broad latitude for further negotia-
tions. 145 Because the Treaty contemplated a single integrated 
project, the Court ordered that all works be jointly operated, 
including those on Slovakian territory; by involving Hungary in 
the operation of Gabcikovo and Cunovo, the Court intended 
Variant C to become a treaty-based regime. l46 Finally, the 
Court suggested that the various claims of each side for com-
pensation could be satisfied by application of a zero sum solu-
tion. 147 
VI. THE ICJ DECISION AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
The Court in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case 
reached an uncomfortable compromise. The ICJ may have 
gone as far as it could have in injecting flexibility into a rigid 
and perhaps untenable treaty regime. In doing so, it may have 
opened the door to reinterpretation of treaties on environ-
mental grounds generally. Nevertheless, in its desire to pro-
vide legally-based incentives for the Parties to remain within 
the Treaty regime, the Court may have created more problems 
than it solved. While the issues between the Parties have sub-
stantially narrowed, each Party can find succor in the ICJ deci-
sion for its own point of view, a point of view that may remain 
uncompromisable given the political context. Yet, the case does 
raise interesting points that have implications for sustainable 
development and environmental protection. 
In this section,l48 some of the implications of the decision 
will be discussed. In particular, the discussion will consider, 
first, whether the ICJ decision requires Hungary to build a sec-
ond dam, a matter of major importance to the current negotia-
tions between the Parties. Then will follow a discussion on the 
implications of the decision for sustainable development, in 
145. See id. at 200. 
146. See id. at 201. See also Williams, supra note 8, at 46-47 (reaching a similar 
conclusion in 1994). 
147. See Judgment, 37I.L.M. at 202. 
148. Parts ofthis section are adapted from Stec & Eckstein, supra note 13. 
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three parts. The first part involves the extent to which the 
case upholds or promotes the integration of environment and 
development. The second part involves the handling of the ap-
plication of evolving norms of the international law of sustain-
able development in interpreting treaties, and the third part 
relates this notion to the balance struck in the judgment be-
tween the law of treaties and the law of international water-
courses. Finally, in this section, the Court's handling of envi-
ronmental evidence will be discussed. 149 
149. Among the matters not discussed in detail here, but which bear further study, 
are the Court's handling of Hungary's argument that Slovakia did not succeed to the 
Treaty, and the arguments concerning the impact of the Provisional Solution on inter-
national borders. See Treaty Concerning the Regime of State Frontiers, Oct. 13 1956, 
Czech.-Hung. 300 V.N.T.S. 150 (hereinafter "Treaty on Frontiers"). Article 3 (1) ofthat 
treaty provides: "On sectors where it runs over water, the frontier line shall vary with 
the changes brought about by natural causes in the median line of the bed of rivers, 
stream or canals or in the main navigable channels of navigable rivers. The frontier 
line shall rwt be affected by other changes in the {low of a frontier water course unless 
the Parties conclude a separate agreement to that effect." [d. at 152 (emphasis added). 
Article 22 of the 1977 Treaty, supra note 77, 1109 V.N.T.S. at 245-246, 32 I.L.M. at 
1256-1257, expressly provided that the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros works would not affect 
the border, which would remain in the centerline of the 1977 main navigation channel 
of the Danube. 
Vnder Article 3(4) of the Treaty on Frontiers, moreover, a Party may require that 
water be re-directed into the original bed of a frontier watercourse, where a change in 
the bed has been brought about by natural causes involving a "change in the character 
oflanded property, constructions, or technical or other installations," unless the Parties 
agree to transfer the frontier line to the new bed. This right must be exercised within 
one year of the diversion. 300 V.N.T.S. at 152. Article 13(2) of the treaty states, in 
pertinent part, "[tlhe position of the beds of frontier watercourses shall as far as possi-
ble be maintained unchanged." [d. at 162. The Final Protocol executed on conclusion 
of this treaty further provided that Article 13, among others, should be considered in 
conjunction with the regulations concerning the Danube as an international waterway 
contained in the Convention Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube, 
August 18, 1948, 33 V.N.T.S. 181. Article 14 of the Treaty on Frontiers states: "[Tlhe 
natural flow of frontier waters in inundated areas may not be altered or obstructed by 
the erection of installations or structures in the water or on the banks, or by any other 
works, unless the Parties so agree." 300 V.N.T.S. at 162. Article 19 concerns dams, 
bridges, dikes and other structures. It states: 
(1) [Tlhe two Parties shall maintain the existing structures and installations in 
frontier waters (dams, dykes and the like). No removal or reconstruction of any 
such structure or installation which is liable to entail a change in the bed or in the 
level of the water in the territory of the other Party may be carried out except with 
the consent of both Parties. 
(2) New bridges, ferries, dams, dykes, sluices, bank supports and other hydraulic in-
stallations shall not be erected in frontier waters except by agreement between the 
two Parties. 
[d. at 164. 
41
Stec: Danube Development
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
358 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:317 
A. DOES THE ICJ DECISION REQUIRE HUNGARY To BUILD A 
SECOND DAM? 
Immediately following the delivery of the decision of the 
Court, the Delegation of the Republic of Hungary issued a 
press release, which asserted that as a result of the Court's de-
cision "Hungary is not required to build a second barrage at 
Nagymaros under the 1977 Treaty."I50 Within weeks, however, 
the Government of Hungary was putting a wholly different 
spin on the decision, in effect conceding that a second dam 
would have to be built, and giving the public the impression 
that Hungary had "lost" the case. What was going on? 
Paragraph 134 of the ICJ decision states: 
[W]hat might have been a correct application of the law 
in 1989 or 1992, if the case had been before the Court 
then, could be a miscarriage of justice if prescribed in 
1997. The Court cannot ignore the fact that the Gabcik-
ovo power plant has been in operation for nearly five 
years, that the bypass canal which feeds the plant re-
ceives its water from a significantly smaller reservoir 
formed by a dam which is built not at Dunakiliti but at 
Cunovo, and that the plant is operated in a run-of-the-
river mode and not in a peak hour mode as originally 
foreseen. Equally, the Court cannot ignore the fact that, 
not only has Nagymaros not been built, but that, with 
the effective discarding by both Parties of peak power op-
eration, there is no longer any point in building it. 151 
This statement must be considered in the context of the 
previous paragraph of the Court's judgment. There the Court 
distinguished between changes based on facts which flow from 
wrongful conduct, which would not be permitted, and changes 
within the context of "the preserved and developing treaty rela-
150. Press Statement, Delegation of the Republic of Hungary (The Hague, Sept. 25, 
1997) (on file with author). 
151. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 200, para. 134 (emphasis added). 
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tionship, "152 in order to remedy an irregular state of affairs 
brought about by the wrongdoing of both Parties. 
Is the Project as unilaterally implemented by Slovakia a 
"Provisional Solution" or a ''Variant''? For not immediately ap-
parent reasons, this question is relevant to the question of 
whether a second dam need be built. The particular factual 
change relied upon by the Court to find that a second dam need 
not be built is Slovakia's "effective discarding" of peak power 
operation, which is inferred from changes to the original plan 
unilaterally undertaken by Czechoslovakia in order to imple-
ment the Provisional Solution. Thus, what was declared by 
Slovakia to be a necessary, temporary measure (a "provisional 
solution")I53 has achieved the status of permanence. Slovakia 
gets to keep Variant C, but at the cost of any hope of forcing 
Hungary to go back to the original plans. This reading of the 
Court's decision is confirmed in Paragraph 150, concerning the 
implications to the Parties, where the direction of the course of 
negotiations suggested by the Court is indicated. The Court 
there stated: 
What it is possible for the Parties to do is to re-establish 
co-operative admjnjstration of what remains of the Proj-
ect. To that end, it is open to them to agree to maintain 
the works at Cunovo, with changes in the mode of op-
eration in respect of the allocation of water and elec-
tricity, and not to build works at Nagymaros. 154 
While not prescriptive, it is evident that this solution is part 
of the Court's scheme for comprehensive resolution of conflict-
ing claims. 
The Court distinguished between obligations of conduct, 
obligations of performance, and obligations of result. 155 To ad-
here blindly to obligations of performance would require not 
152. [d. at 150, para. 133. 
153. See id. at 187, para. 61 (referring to Variant C as a variant "presented as a 
provisional solution."). 
154. [d. at 202, para. 150 (emphasis added). 
155. See id. at 200, para. 135. 
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only the building of N agymaros, but also the demolition of the 
works at Cunovo, which would be absurd "when the objectives 
of the Treaty can be adequately served by the existing struc-
tures. "156 Moreover, the obligations of performance under the 
1977 Treaty regime were determined primarily through the 
Joint Contractual Plan, which had frequently been amended by 
the Parties to reflect changing conditions and circumstances. 157 
Thus, the Court determined that the proper shaping of the 
treaty regime should be done by negotiation of the Parties 
through the Joint Contractual Plan. 156 
The declaration that N agymaros need not be built is rele-
vant both as direct guidance to the Parties as to the question of 
the second dam, as well as to the question of compensation. 
Because the obligations of performance are not sacrosanct, Slo-
vakia bears equal responsibility for the abandonment of peak 
power production, and cannot make a claim against Hungary 
for compensation based on the reduced economic benefits of the 
current regime. This is at the root of the "zero sum" resolution 
of conflicting compensation claims. 159 
156. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 200, para. 136. 
157. See id. at 200, para. 137. 
158. The Court also dealt with the fact that a system of locks at Nagymaros was 
specifically mentioned in the 1977 Treaty itself by pointing to numerous statements 
made by Czechoslovakia that it was willing to consider limitation or exclusion of peak 
power operation. [d. at 200, para. 138. Arguably, however, the building of a system of 
locks at N agymaros is an obligation of result under the 1977 Treaty regime, since only 
the main dimensions of the works of the System of Locks are to be determined under 
the Joint Contractual Plan. See 1977 Treaty, supra note 77, art 4.2(a), 1109 V.N.T.S. 
at 238, 32 I.L.M. at 1251. Dams both at Dunakiliti and Nagymaros are parts of the 
principal works ofthe System of Locks as defined under the Treaty. [d. art 1.2, 1109 
V.N.T.S. at 236-237, 32 I.L.M. at 1249. It would have been perhaps more straightfor-
ward for the Court to determine that Variant C had rendered moot the specific compo-
nents of the term ·System of Locks" found in Article 1.2, but that would have opened 
the door too far towards frustration of the entire treaty regime. Preservation of the 
treaty regime was fundamental to the Court's decision since it allowed the Court to 
fmd that Hungary had joint control over all works constructed pursuant to Variant C. 
159. The Court did, however, separate these claims from claims based on the 
shared costs of construction and operation of the Project. 
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B. THE ICJ's INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
The concept of sustainable development is one of the linch-
pins of the Court's decision. Its operation, according to the 
Court, is to require the Parties to "look afresh at the effects on 
the environment of the operation of the Gabcikovo power 
plant. "160 The central position of environmental considerations 
at the heart of sustainable development was thus upheld by the 
Court. Elsewhere in the decision, the Court simply and 
straightforwardly held that the protection of the natural envi-
ronment is an "essential interest" of a state. 161 Yet the concept 
of sustainable development was not considered or applied in 
connection with many other parts of the Court's judgment 
where further shape could have been given to it. For example, 
the Court applied an overly simple cost-benefit approach when 
it took note of the immense investment that Czechoslovakia 
had made in the Gabcikovo works. 162 Nowhere in the Court's 
decision is it stated that this immense investment should be 
considered in the light of potential environmental costs, and 
that this consideration should include a proper dose of precau-
tion. 
Both Hungary and Czechoslovakia committed transgres-
sions of intemationallaw. In attempting to justify their ac-
tions, the states asserted different interests. For Hungary, it 
was primarily the protection of the natural environment; for 
Czechoslovakia, it was the immense economic investment in 
160. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 201, para. 140. 
161. [d. at 184, para. 53. 
162. The investment argument was used by Slovakia to assert its position that 
Czechoslovakia had no choice but to implement Variant C as an approximate applica-
tion. See id. at 189, para. 68. The Court particularly took note of this in Paragraph 72, 
as follows: 
[Tlhe Court wishes to make clear that it is aware of the serious problems with 
which Czechoslovakia was confronted as a result of Hungary's decision to re-
linquish most of the construction of the System of Locks for which it was re-
sponsible by virtue of the 1977 Treaty. Vast investments had been made, the 
construction at Gabcikovo was all but fmished, the bypass canal was com-
pleted, and Hungary itself, in 1991, had duly fulfilled its obligations under the 
Treaty in this respect in completing work on the tailrace canal ... [Nlot using 
the system would have led to considerable fmancial losses, and ... could have 
given rise to serious problems for the environment. 
[d. at 182, para. 72. 
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the Project. While both were viewed sympathetically by the 
Court, the Court missed an opportunity to see the two sets of 
interests as two sides of the same coin. The Court might have 
more clearly connected the viability of the immense invest-
ment, especially in the context of the implications of present 
uncertainty for future generations, to the proper consideration 
of environmental protection. 
Underlying the Court's decision is a proceed-at-all-costs ap-
proach. At the same time that the Court is calling for applica-
tion of the concept of sustainable development by constant re-
consideration of the environmental consequences of a project, it 
does not seem to consider the possibility that this reconsidera-
tion might result in a complete abandonment of the Project. 163 
The consideration of alternatives is a well accepted element of 
environmental impact assessment. l64 It is equally well ac-
cepted that the ~o action" alternative must be given equal 
standing to both the original proposal and to other alternatives 
presented. 1OO Yet, the Court found Hungary's defense of the "no 
action" alternative to be "not conducive to negotiations."166 The 
logical inference of the Court's analysis is that enviTonmental 
considerations must continually be taken into account, but only 
to modify and not to justify termination of a treaty regime. 
This view may arise from the notion of at least some of the 
judges that technological, end-of-pipe solutions could be applied 
to address significant environmental problems. 167 Thus, the 
163. See generally EDWARD GoLDSMITH & NICHOLAS HILDYARD, THE SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF LARGE DAMS (1985) (discussing the environmental con· 
sequences of barrage systems). 
164. See, e.g., Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans· 
boundary Context, Feb. 25 1991,30 I.L.M. 800 (1991) (hereinafter Espoo Convention). 
Appendix II, point (b), "(A) description, where appropriate, of reasonable alternatives 
(for example, locational or technological) to the proposed activity and also the no·action 
alternative." [d. at 814. 
165. See, e.g., id. 
166. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 195, para. 107. 
167. See id. at 185. See also Stec & Eckstein, supra note 13, at 48 n.S, which states: 
(E)ven Judge Weeramantry's enlightened opinion takes only the first steps 
towards a truly integrated approach to environment and development. The 
principle of sustainable development, according to Judge Weeramantry, en-
ables the Court to balance environmental considerations against developmen-
tal considerations. Unfamiliarity with the concept of integration reached a 
peak in Judge Oda's dissent, in which the judge took the view that economic 
development and preservation of the environment are more or less contradic-
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attitude of the ICJ to the arguments made by the Parties, and 
its implicit balancing of interests, seems to indicate that it gave 
insufficient consideration to the "no action" alternative and 
placed too much faith in technical solutions. In so doing, the 
Court gave little support to the precautionary principle and 
missed the opportunity to give further definition to the concept 
of sustainable development. 
C. APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL PRINCIPAL OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 
The Court may not have fully integrated environment and 
development in its own analysis, but it certainly opened the 
door to better integration of environment and development in 
treaty-based regimes in the future. It did so through the sim-
ple statement that "newly developed norms of environmental 
law are relevant for the implementation of the Treaty. "168 
Again, the Magic Articles played a role in the Court's determi-
nation. These treaty provisions were found to have expressly 
allowed for the continuous application of environmental norms 
as they developed. The Magic Articles alone may have been 
legally sufficient to resolve that aspect of the dispute. But, af-
ter considering the meaning of the Magic Articles, the Court 
then stated: 
The Court is mindful that, in the field of environmental 
protection, vigilance and prevention are required on ac-
count of the often irreversible character of damage to 
the environment and of the limitations inherent in the 
very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage. 
Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and 
other reasons, constantly interfered with nature. In the 
past, this was often done without consideration of the ef-
fects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific in-
sights and to a growing awareness of the risks for man-
tory. He contends that "modern technology would, I am sure, be able to pro· 
vide some acceptable ways of balancing the two conflicting interests.· 
(citing Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 37 I.L.M. 
162, 224 (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda)) (emphasis added). 
168. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 196, para. 112. 
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kind-for present and future generations~f pursuit of 
such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated 
pace, new norms and standards have been developed, 
set forth in a great number of instruments during the 
last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into. 
consideration, and such new standards given proper 
weight, not only when States contemplate new activities 
but also when continuing with activities begun in the 
past. This need to reconcile economic development with 
protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the 
concept of sustainable development.169 
Hereby, the Court went beyond the Magic Articles as the 
basis of its ruling and stated a general principle of intema-
tionallaw applicable to the interpretation of treaties generally, 
based on the concept of sustainable development. This ruling 
is a major clarification of the law of sustainable development 
and the manner in which it can be applied to reform treaty-
based regimes. In the context of the judgment in Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project Case, moreover, it provides a basis for fun-
damental restructuring of the original project in a manner 
quite different from that envisioned at the time of the signing 
of the 1977 Treaty. The Court thus indicates that application 
of the concept of sustainable development in similar cases 
would require that environmental risks be assessed on a con-
tinuous basis, even for projects started long ago. 170 
1. Judge Weeramantry's Opinion 
From the separate opinion of Vice President Weeramantry 
we may find a name for this new emerging legal norm - the 
Principle of Continuing Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA).17l Judge Weeramantry's opinion gives a much deeper 
background to some of the issues at the heart of the Court's 
decision, in particular with respect to sustainable development. 
He advocates examination of traditional principles from the 
world's vast cultural heritage for elaboration of the principle of 
169. Id. at 201, para. 140 (emphasis added). 
170. Id. at 58, para. 119. 
171. Weeramantry, 37 I.L.M. at 214. 
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sustainable development,172 and calls for the ''harmonization of 
human developmental work with respect for the natural envi-
ronment."l73 Among his proposals in furtherance of these objec-
tives are two intemationallegal principles. Besides the Princi-
ple of Continuing Environmental Impact Assessment, he also 
sets forth the Principle of Contemporaneity in the Application 
of Environmental Norms. Furthermore, he advocates resort to 
erga omnes 174 analysis in the resolution of traditionally inter 
partes disputes with sustainable development issues. 175 
172. [d. at 207. By way of example, he points to Sri Lanka, which was "developed" 
in order to be conquered for agriculture, in a way that protected the environment. But, 
his characterization of an ancient form of sustainable development raises more ques-
tions than it answers. He points in particular to the reconstruction work of King 
Parakrama Bahu (1153-1186) and to the philosophy of conservation based on the ser-
mon of the Buddhist Arahat Mahinda to King Devanampiya Tissa around 223 B.C. 
But King Bahu was driven by the notion that not a drop of rain would enter the ocean 
without being made useful to man. This extreme anthropocentrism-basically this is 
rational utilization-is difficult to reconcile with the enormously long reach of the Bud-
dhist concept of duty beyond man himself to the natural order. Yet, Weeramantry cites 
these together as a case of sustainable development. [d. at 209-210. 
173. Weeramantry, 37 I.L.M. at 212. He goes on to cite GoLDSMITH & HILDYARD, 
supra note 163, for the proposition that traditional irrigation systems demonstrate a 
much higher success rate than modem irrigation systems because of a better fit be-
tween the traditional methods and nature. See id. at 213. Such a proposition goes 
hand in hand with Collingridge and Reeve's notion of flexibility in investments, and the 
efficacy oftrial and error decisionmaking. See COLLING RIDGE & REEVE, supra note 84. 
Judge Weeramantry takes the first steps, but does not go far enough in examining the 
basic differences between a flexible process gradually achieving stasis, and a rigid, all-
or-nothing gargantuan that provides no easy means for adjustments when present-day 
uncertainties become tomorrow's realities. The principle of trusteeship of earth re-
sources is called by Weeramantry a "traditional principle" that can assist in the devel-
opment of modem environmental law. Weeramantry, 37 I.L.M. at 213. This is a duty 
that requires express protection of flora and fauna, since they have a niche in the eco-
logical system. Nature must be afforded an opportunity to replenish itself. But a col-
lectivist anthropocentric approach can still be detected in Judge Weeramantry's view 
that natural resources are "collectively" owned for the maximum service of people. He 
concludes that sustainable development is "one of the most ancient of ideas in the hu-
man heritage." [d. 
174. Erga omnes (toward all) is used in international human rights law to refer to 
obligations which are owed to the international community independently of specific 
obligations owed through treaties or conventions. See e.g., East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 
1995 I.C.J. 90, 102. The term has also been used to indicate that a particular judicial 
decision applies to all similarly situated persons, not only to the parties to the particu-
lar case. See, e.g., Villalobos v. Costa Rica, Case 9328, 9239, 9742, 9884, 10.131, 
10.193, 10.230, 10.429, 10.469, Report No. 24.192, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 74, 
OEAlSer.lJVIII.83 Doc. 14 (1993); <http://www.l.umn.edu.humanrts/casest24-92-
COSTA-RICA.htm>. 
175. Weeramantry, 37 I.L.M at 266; See infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
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As a preliminary matter, Slovakia's submissions that sus-
tainable development was not an operative norm of customary 
intemationallaw176 had to be countered. In its pleadings and 
arguments before the Court, however, Slovakia had reversed 
the usual formulation and contended that sustainable devel-
opment includes the principle that "developmental needs are to 
be taken into account in interpreting and applying environ-
mental obligations."l77 This statement, in Judge Weeraman-
try's opinion, indicated acceptance of sustainable development 
as the principle that harmonizes two vital and developing areas 
of law. For Slovakia to deny the applicability of sustainable 
development precepts, therefore, would be to condone a state of 
"normative anarchy." To further support the view that sus-
tainable development was nothing new, even as between the 
parties, Judge Weeramantry found substantial evidence in the 
record that the Magic Articles, which inserted in the treaty an 
element of dynamism in relation to environmental considera-
tions, arose out of an early notion of sustainable development. 
The Principle of Continuing EIA is derived from the duty to 
continuously monitor the environmental impacts of develop-
ment projects as facts and knowledge progress. However, it 
goes further in requiring an exchange of information so that 
continuing environmental impact assessment178 can be accom-
plished in a cooperative way. According to Judge Weeraman-
try, this is more than a mere concept, it is a principle with 
176. See Counter·Memorial Submitted by the Slovak Republic, The Hague (Dec. 5, 
1994) (SCM), Vol. I, par. 9.80·82. 
177. SCM, supra note 176, para. 9.53, quoted in Weeramantry, 37 I.L.M. at 205 
(emphasis added). 
178. Through the understanding that EIA can never be expected to !mticipate every 
possible environmental danger, Judge Weeramantry in effect expresses a preference for 
a particular model of "biosphere reflection"-that is, the consideration of impacts of 
actions on the biosphere (a term chosen as a broad category that includes both EIA and 
other procedures designed for the same purpose, such as "ecological expertise"). The 
kind of flexible decisionmaking assumed by Judge Weeramantry when he states that 
EIA is a dynamic principle "not confined to a pre-project evaluation of possible envi-
ronmental consequences," Weeramantry, 37 I.L.M. at 214, is somewhat lacking in eco-
logical expertise procedures. See Stephen Stec, EIA and EE in CEE and CIS: Conver-
gence or Evolution? in A WORLD SURVEY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 42, at 
343-358. 
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normative value, with potential application to a broad range of 
projects on the national and intemationallevel. 179 
Behind the Principle of Continuing EIA is the Principle of 
Contemporaneity in the Application of Environmental 
Norms. l80 Judge Weeramantry proposes that, as the under-
standing of human rights evolves,181 evolving norms must be 
applied accordingly; "the ethical and human rights related as-
pects of environmental law bring it within the category of law 
so essential to human welfare that we cannot apply to today's 
problems in this field the standards of yesterday."182 The Prin-
ciple of Continuing EIA may be considered to be just one exam-
. pIe of the kinds of evolving environmental norms that are to be 
applied. The Principle of Contemporaneity in the Application 
of Environmental Norms is, thus, the operative principle from 
which the totality of sustainable development as outlined by 
the Court emanates. 
The Weeramantry opinion does not stop with a theoretical 
discussion of principles but goes on to consider the implications 
of sustainable development for the question of whether, in en-
vironmental cases, inter partes principles ought to be applied. 
This question is of obvious importance to the operation of the 
law of treaties - in particular the sanctity of pacta sunt ser-
vanda - on disputes with potential environmental conse-
quences. He concludes that environmental issues by their fluid 
and transboundary nature generally have erga omnes quality. 
Thus, where such issues are of sufficient importance, estoppel 
and other inter partes arguments should not be applied. He 
states the point as follows: 
179. Weeramantry, 37 I.L.M. at 214-215. 
180. A general term for the contemporary application of evolving norms of law is 
"inter-temporal law." See Martin Dixon, Case and Comment: The Danube Dams and 
International Law, 57 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 4 (1998). 
181. And "environmental rights are human rights." Weeramantry, 37 I.L.M. at 215. 
182. Id. at 215. One implication of these two principles would be that the Czech 
Republic's argument against holding an ErA with respect to the Temelin nuclear power 
plant would be invalidated. The Czech Republic holds that the Temelin plant construc-
tion is not subject to an EIA because its construction was started prior to the effective 
date ofthe ErA law. 
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We have entered an era of international law· in which 
international law not only subserves the interests of in-
dividual states but also looks beyond them and their pa-
rochial concerns to the greater interests of humanity 
and to planetary welfare. In addressing such problems, 
which transcend the individual rights and obligations of 
the litigating states, international law will need to look 
beyond procedural rules fashioned for purely inter par-
tes litigation. 183 
The possibility opened by the decision of the Court to reform 
treaty-based regimes implicitly recognized the erga omnes na-
ture of environmental impacts alluded to by Judge Weeraman-
try. The practical effect of greater recognition of environmental 
concerns in the service of sustainable development might logi-
cally be primarily in the realm of fashioning remedies. While 
the wider interest in avoidance of harm would not necessarily 
affect the fact of obligations, it might work against expectations 
of specific performance and might introduce an element of 
flexibility in remedies. Thus, a party to a treaty, the object of 
which may reasonably found to result in devastating conse-
quences for the environment, could not necessarily be com-
pelled under the law of treaties to specific performance, and 
could justifiably terminate the treaty. 
The above principles and approaches aid in the clarification 
of the compromise reached by the majority of the Court. Full 
application of the Principle of Contemporaneity in Application 
of Environmental Norms as envisioned by Judge Weeramantry 
might require, in the present case, further procedures and pro-
cesses based on, for example, the Principle of Continuing EIA. 
It cannot be excluded that application of the Principle of Con-
tinuing EIA in the past might have led to a conclusion that the 
optimal implementation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros works 
would have been the "no action" alternative. 184 TIns further 
brings into question the Court's failure to respect a status quo 
ante based upon prior physical and ecological values in favor of 
183. Id. at 216. 
184. For a discussion of how these concepts might be applied post-decision, see dis-
cussion, infra notes 244-264 and accompanying text. 
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a fait accompli in the form of Variant C, and its negative atti-
tude towards Hungary's stand in favor of preserving the "no 
action" alternative in the face of Czechoslovakia's advance. 
D. BALANCE BETWEEN LAW OF TREATIES AND LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 
The holding concerning Variant C presented an important 
opportunity for environmental values to be raised in relation to 
a certain category of projects under a treaty-based regime -
ones involving shared natural resources. Applying sustainable 
development notions, the Court struck a balance between the 
law of treaties and the law of international watercourses. Yet, 
it was a difficult compromise for the Court, as shown by the 
judges' voting. The Court distinguished between the construc-
tion of Variant C, which was not internationally wrongful, and 
the implementation of that scheme, which constituted a trans-
gression of international law. l85 With respect to implementa-
tion there was general agreement that Czechoslovakia's unilat-
eral diversion of the Danube was in violation of Hungary's 
right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of an interna-
tional watercourse under customary international law. l86 The 
Court was more divided on the construction issue. 
The Court emphasized the notion of an equitable and rea-
sonable sharing of an international watercourse underlying the 
Treaty. The equitable use doctrine has found expression in the 
recently adopted United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,187 art. 5: 
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territo-
ries utilize an international watercourse in an equitable 
185. This is evident from the votes on the Court concerning "proceeding to" the 
"Provisional Solution" on the one hand and "putting it into operation" on the other. 
Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 191, para. 88. 
186. See id. at 191, para. 85. 
187. Supra note 12. Note that the Permanent Court of International Justice went 
beyond equitable use to a concept of "perfect equality" of riparian states. See Territo-
rial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A) No. 23, at 27 (noting that all riparian states enjoy a "perfect equality" in the use of 
the waters of shared rivers). 
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and reasonable manner. In particular, an international 
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse 
States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable 
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into 
account the interests of the watercourse States con-
cerned, consistent with adequate protection of the wa-
tercourse. 
2. Watercourse States shall participate in these, devel-
opment and protection of an international watercourse 
in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participa-
tion includes both the right to utilize the watercourse 
and the duty to cooperate in the protection and devel-
opment thereof, as provided ill the present 
Convention. 188 
The equitable use doctrine also finds expression in. article 2, 
para. 2 of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes,189 which 
states, in relevant part: 
The Parties shall ... take all appropriate measures ... 
[t]o ensure that transboundary waters are used in a 
reasonable and equitable way, taking into particular ac-
count their transboundary character, in the case of ac-
tivities which cause or are likely to cause transbOlmdary 
. ct 190 llDpa .... 
Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable use are set 
forth in Article 6 of the Non-Navigational Uses Convention and 
include the natural character of the watercourse, actual and 
potential uses, social and economic needs of riparian states, 
costs of conservation and protection measures, and compara-
tive costs and availability of alternative uses.191 Factors are 
also expressed in the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters 
188. Non-Navigational Uses Convention, supra note 12,. 
189. March 17, 1992, 31 1. L. M. 1312. 
190. [d. para. 2(c). 
191. Supra note 12. See also Stec & Eckstein, supra note 13, at 45. 
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of International Rivers.192 The list includes "climate, geography 
and hydrology of the basin, past and existing uses of the wa-
ters, the economic and social needs of each state, the popula-
tion dependent on the waters of the basin, the availability and 
cost of alternatives, the practicability of resolving the conflict 
through compensation, and the degree to which waste and un-
necessary injury can be avoided."193 
The Court had no trouble determining that a unilateral di-
version of an international watercourse could, under no cir-
cumstances, be considered equitable and reasonable to down-
stream users. 194 While the Court's judgment discussed the eq-
uitable use doctrine as a generally applicable principle of cus-
tomary international law, at least one commentator has noted 
that the 1977 Treaty regime appears to follow this doctrine, 195 
while establishing a regime for the mitigation of environmental 
degradation in protection of the interests of downstream ri-
parian users.196 Slovakia could not convince the Court that the 
implementation of Variant C was justified as an approximate 
application of the 1977 Treaty. 197 This aspect of the Court's 
decision was based essentially on Hungary's lack of participa-
tion in Variant C, which was sufficient to invalidate it as a 
joint project. The implication, therefore, is that Czechoslovakia 
did not respect the Treaty's mechanisms for attaining equitable 
use when it sought to impose its own view of the Project's costs 
and benefits. The diversion was rendered unilateral because it 
was outside the confines of the 1977 Treaty. 
Approximate application, thus, cannot be used for one party 
to extract its benefits from a failed joint project, at least where 
it involves an international watercourse. The decision also ap-
pears to foreclose the possibility that a state might argue for 
approximate application whether or not it attempts to take into 
192. August 20,1966, art. V, 52 l.L.A. 484. 
193. Schwabach, supra note 3, at 331 (citations omitted). 
194. See Judgment, 37 l.L.M. at 190-191, paras. 78,85. 
195. See Williams, supra note 8, at 46 (referring to Articles 5 and 9 of the 1977 
Treaty, which provide for sharing of both the costs and benefits arising from the proj-
ect). 
196. See id. (referring to Articles 18-20 of the 1977 Treaty). 
197. Judgment, 37 l.L.M. at 190, paras 75-78. 
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account the interests of the other state, on the grounds that 
each state has the right to determine within appropria.te limits 
the balance of its own interests with respect to a shared natu-
ral resource. This means that if one party balks due to envi-
ronmental concerns, a treaty relating to such a joint project 
ought never to be unilaterally executed. Where new environ-
mental considerations are raised by one party to a regime for a 
project related to certain shared natural resources in the fu-
ture, it would seem to be exceedingly difficult for construction 
to proceed to completion. This amounts to a type of environ-
mental veto power by one state. Moreover, it would appear 
that such environmental concerns could be raised at any time, 
and that, in accordance with Judge Weeramantry's view, the 
other state could not succeed with inter partes arguments, such 
as estoppel, to limit a people's right to an equitable and rea-
sonable sharing of an international watercourse. 
The theoretical crack in the sanctity of treaties might, how-
ever, be too small to be of much use. Even if the right of one 
state to prevent another from implementing a maverick solu-
tion provides some measure of relief from the Court's strained 
reasoning, exercising the veto power could not be done except 
at substantial risk. Czechoslovakia was not found to have re-
fused to consult· with Hungary concerning possible environ-
mental protection measures, even though it refused to stop 
work on Variant C.198 Moreover, the Court did not indicate un-
der what conditions a state might legitimately abandon work 
on account of sustainable development concerns. Rather, sus-
pension of work in the Court's view might be considered "not 
conducive to negotiations."199 The rmding that Hungary con-
tributed to the failure of negotiations under the Magic Articles 
would seem to make it exceedingly difficult for a state to aban-
don construction of any project, no matter how clearly its envi-
ronmental impacts outweighed other consideratIons and re-
gardless of irreversible harm. The Court preferred a status quo 
based on an existing legal regime-in this case for construction 
198. For an argument that Czechoslovakia's refusal to stop construction of Variant 
C may be a violation of the principle of good faith negotiations, see Eckstein, supra note 
9, at 113. 
199. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 195. 
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of the barrage system-to a status quo based on physical and 
'. 
environmental conditions (the usual starting point for envi-
ronmental impact assessment).200 Thus, the Court allowed for 
the continuation of profound activities with uncertain, but po-
tentially devastating environmental effects, making it rather 
difficult for a state to reasonably hold forth the "no action" al-
ternative for a project with its conception at a time in the past 
when environmental values were less perfectly formed. An at-
tempt by a state to apply the precautionary principle is, there-
fore, rather risky. 
The Court's handling of Slovakia's defenses is reasonably 
clear.20l The Court's view of the interaction between the law of 
treaties and the law of international watercourses on the ques-
tion of the preparatory acts by Czechoslovakia is less clear. 
Because of the basic split on the bench between those who 
found Variant C justifiable completely, and those who found 
even its construction to be a violation of Czechoslovakia's in-
ternational obligations, only four judges were in the majority 
on both issues.202 The distinction between preparatory acts and 
executory acts made by the Court, whatever its basis, was dis-
positive in dismissing Hungary's argument that its purported 
termination of the 1977 Treaty was lawful and effective. It has 
been pointed out that this distinction can be linked to consid-
erations of sovereignty where the preparatory acts took place 
solely on the territory of Czechoslovakia.203 Yet, this is not a 
wholly satisfactory explanation, where the acts in question 
were justified on the basis of a treaty and involved an interna-
tional watercourse. 
200. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 37 
l.L.M. 162, 236-237, paras. 6·9. (dissenting opinion of Parra-Aranguren, J.). The 
starting point for an EIA (or EIS as required under the National Environmental Policy 
(NEPA), 102(2)(C)(iii) and 102(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. 4342(2)(C)(iii) and 4342(2)(E) may be 
inferred from the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations on Environmental 
Impact Statements, which require consideration of a "no action" alternative. See 40 
C.F.R. § 1502.14. 
201. Neither was the Court persuaded by Slovakia's other defenses. While con-
firming that the proper analysis of the diversion was in the context of the law of coun-
ter-measures, the Court established that the unilateral diversion of a transboundary 
watercourse is presumptively disproportionate as a countermeasure to a breach of a 
treaty. See Dixon, supra note 180, at 3. 
202. These were Judges Weeramantry, Guillaume, Shi and Kooijmans. 
203. See Dixon, supra note 180, at 3. 
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In the largest expression of disunity on the bench, six judges 
concluded that Czechoslovakia had no right to proceed to the 
provisional solution. In particular, the dissenters felt lmable to 
distinguish between the substantial work that had been done 
to complete Variant C and its being put into operation.204 
While a diversion of an international watercourse had not 
taken place, and, therefore, the law of international water-
courses was not relevant, nevertheless Czechoslovakia's prog-
ress towards Variant C had implicitly belied its good faith to-
wards Hungary's concerns and, in the opinion of four of the dis-
senters, had justifiably prompted Hungary's termination of the 
treaty. The dissenters did not accept the opinion of the major-
ity that Czechoslovakia's immense investment should be con· 
sidered in its favor. 205 
While conceding that the implementation of Variant C was 
an internationally wrongful act, the Court held that construc-
tion of that Variant, at great expense, even up to the very point 
of flicking the switch, was not a breach of Czechoslovakia's ob-
ligation of good faith dealing.206 In the view of the dissenters, 
however, the Court might well have distinguished between an 
"immense investment" in something, which upon execution 
would be a violation of international law, and an immense in-
vestment in good faith execution of a treaty.207 If Czechoslova-
kia had been held not to have acted in good faith, the validity of 
Hungary's termination would be bolstered. It was critical to 
reaching the Court's intended result that Hungary's attempt at 
termination of the 1977 Treaty be ineffectual. Otherwise, the 
Court would have difficulty in achieving its intended aim -
maintaining a treaty regime based on the current situation, in 
204. See, e.g. Declaration of President Schwebel, 37 I.L.M. 204 ("I view the con-
struction of 'Variant C,' the 'provisional solution,' as inseparable from its being put into 
operation"); see also the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 37 I.L.M. 162, 
228-229 (dissenting opinion of Fleischhauer, J.) !hereinafter Fleischhauerl. 
205. E.g., Fleischhauer, at 37 I.L.M. at 230. 
206. Czechoslovakia's good faith, or lack thereof, played a major role in Judge 
Fleishhauer's opinion. 
207. A fuller analysis of this question would require the separation of those invest-
ments which were consistent with the Project as revised in accordance with the Court's 
judgment, and those investments which were not consistent with the revised regime -
that is, those investments which were "inside" or "outside" the scope of the reformed 
Treaty. 
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which Hungary has joint control over the works. By confirming 
Hungary's joint control over the Gabcikovo works, the decision 
confers benefits on Hungary from the continued operation of 
the works in the future that might give Hungary an interest in 
accepting the Court's decision. 
But, couldn't Hungary have terminated the treaty at any 
time following the implementation of Variant C since that was 
a material breach of the Treaty? Realizing this possibility, the 
Court did not depend only on incentives; rather, it went further 
to apply a legal rule that prevented Hungary from ever termi-
nating the 1977 Treaty based on the implementation of Variant 
C. Hungary was declared to have prejudiced its right to termi-
nate the Treaty because of its own prior wrongful conduct. 208 
The Court pointed to a "generally accepted" principle that one 
party to an agreement may not take advantage of another's 
failure to fulfill an obligation or make use of a means of redress 
if that party prevented the other from doing so through an ille-
gal act.209 Yet, there is an illogic to the Court's pronouncement. 
The Court declares that Czechoslovakia had no legal basis for 
implementation of Variant C, implying that it was not a legal 
consequence of Hungary's abandonment of works at Nagyma-
ros. At the same time, it fmds that there are legal conse-
quences laid upon Hungary because there may be a factual or 
political basis for Czechoslovakia's implementation of Variant 
C.210 
208. See Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 196, para. 10. 
209. [d. at 196, para. 110, citing Factory at Chorzow, Jurisdiction, Judgment No.8, 
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.9, at 31. While the language of the Permanent Court of In· 
ternational Justice in that case speaks only of an "obligation," this term should gener-
ally be considered to refer to obligations under the subject agreement or those arising 
under the agreement itself. Whereas the obligation violated by Czechoslovakia in the 
implementation of Variant C was based on customary international law rules relating 
to international and boundary waters, the Court is implicitly declaring that Hungary's 
violation of the 1977 Treaty prevented Czechoslovakia from observing these customary 
international rules, thus compelling Czechoslovakia to implement Variant C. It is 
difficult to square this with the Court's decision that Variant C was not a lawful coun-
termeasure. See id. at 190-191, paras. 82-87. 
210. Compare this result with the Court's statement elsewhere: "[Tlhis does not 
mean that facts - in this case facts which flow from wrongful conduct - determine the 
law. The principle ex injuria jus non oritur is sustained by the Court's finding that the 
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The rule declared by the Court would seem to create more 
problems than it solves. In the fIrst place, it weakens the po-
tential use of legal arguments to prevent a second internation-
ally wrongful act. States which have committed prior wrongful 
acts may thereby have lost their ability to refer to the law to 
deter wrongful conduct by those States they have harmed.211 
Considering the fact that environmental wrongs may have erga 
omnes effects, weakening of the subject of international law 
most likely to challenge such wrongs opens the door to further 
environmental degradation. Of equal significance, it estab-
lishes a category of instances where a State may benefit from 
its own commission of an internationally wrongful act, thus 
condoning and indirectly encouraging illegal behavior by 
States?12 If one party to a treaty may prejudice its right to 
terminate the treaty on any grounds,213 the harmed party not 
only may insist on performance of the treaty obligations, but 
may do so while itself frustrating the object or purpose of the 
treaty-even while not acting in good faith. While such conse-
quences may in theory cause States to hesitate before commit-
ting a fIrst wrongful act, in reality the legal situation is often 
clear only in hindsight. Intended perhaps as one piece of a 
comprehensive solution that might, in the eyes of the Court, 
satisfy both parties, the rule is a harsh one with unforeseeable 
consequences. 
legal relationship created by the 1977 Treaty is preserved and cannot in this case be 
treated as voided by unlawful conduct." Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 200, para. 133. 
211. While the Court's decision refers specifically to the right to terminate a treaty, 
there is nothing in the decision that would distinguish between the forfeiture of this 
right and of other rights of states under international law . 
212. Even in the most limited reading of the rule, it confers a legal advantage on 
States that carry out disproportionate countermeasures. However, in this case the 
countermeasure is disproportionate because in itself it violates customary international 
law. 
213. This is the implication of the statement that Hungary's prior breach had 
prejudiced its right to terminate the Treaty, even in the case that Czechoslovakia "had 
violated a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the 
Treaty." Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 196, para. 110. 
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E. THE ICJ's CONSIDERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
EVIDENCE 
Before the ICJ issued its decision, the outcome of the case 
was expected to depend on the Court's assessment of the evi-
dence presented by the Parties of environmental degradation or 
risk. 214 The proper role of evidence, scientific evidence in par-
ticular, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case is empha-
sized by the fact that in this case the ICJ exercised for the first 
time in its history the possibility under its rules to actually 
visit a site pertaining to a case before it.215 The Parties placed 
great emphasis on their respective views of the scientific evi-
dence, both in the pleadings and in oral argument. 216 Disap-
pointingly for those hoping for guidance from the COurt,217 the 
ICJ failed both to adequately evaluate the scientific evidence 
presented,218 and to pronounce on the evidentiary standard.219 
214. See Gaetan Verhoosel, Gabcikovo·Nagymaros: The Evidentiary Regime on En· 
vironmental Degradation and the World Court, 6 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 247 (1997); 
Williams, supra note 8, at 57 ("The environmental evidence will playa key role."). 
215. The site visit was undertaken under Article 66 of the Rules of Court pursuant 
to the Court's functions with regard to the obtaining of evidence. See Judgment, 37 
I.L.M. at 172, para. 10. As a result, the ICJ shares with the former Permanent Court 
of International Justice the fact that its only site visit was in connection with a case 
involving a transboundary watercourse. The latter court exercised this function in 
Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.l.J. (ser. AlB) No. 70. See 
Peter Tomka & Samuel S. Wordsworth, Current Developments: The First Site Visit of 
the International Court of Justice in Fulfillment of Its Judicial Function, 92 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 133, 134 (1998). The two Parties executed a Joint Protocol which served as a 
formal proposal to the Court to exercise its functions. See id. at 136. The site visit sets 
an interesting precedent for particularly technical disputes. See id. at 140. See also 
Verhoosel, supra note 214, at 248. 
216. Memorial of the Republic of Hungary, The Hague (2 May 1994) Vol. V; Memo· 
rial submitted by the Slovak Republic, The Hague (2 May 1994) Vol. III. 
217. One commentator asserted that "the Court's pronouncements on the environ-
ment are necessarily more recommendatory than prescriptive." P.H.F. Bekker, Gab-
cikovo·Nagymaros Project, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 273, 278 (1998). 
218. Hungary's assertions included: the role of the banks of the river in filtration of 
drinking water and the more general consideration that the complex system of tribu-
taries in the Szigetkoz reduces overall pollution of the Danube; the stretch of the Da-
nube in the area of the barrage system is extremely diverse in flora and fauna, see 
Williams, supra note 8, at 16 n.82 (and sources cited therein); this area is on top of a 
geologically young fault, see id. at 17 n.89 (and sources cited therein); the project is not 
economically viable, see id. at 17-18 nn.94-96 (and accompanying text.) On the other 
hand, Slovakia contended that, far from the project being environmentally disastrous, 
it would actually have environmental benefits in reduced erosion and flood control. See 
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Without passing on the evidence, the Court nevertheless 
made use of it to support its conclusions at several turns. 
While it may be beyond the Court's abilities to resolve differ-
ences of scientific opinion, the Court must have engaged in 
some weighing of the evidence in order to determine that the 
environmental threat claimed by Hungary was not "imminent." 
In discussing the proportionality of the diversion as a counter-
measure, the Court must have done some weighing when it 
referred to "the continuing effects of the diversion of these wa-
ters on the ecology of the riparian area of Szigetkoz."220 But, 
there is little indication of the Court's assessment of particular 
facts alleged or scientific conclusions reached. By the handling 
of the argument of necessity and the lack of attention paid to 
environmental impacts of the Danube diversion, it might be 
concluded that the Court gave relatively little weight to the 
environmental evidence it heard. 
Although it did not sustain Hungary's argument for a state 
of necessity, the ICJ did acknowledge environmental protection 
as an essential state interest and left the door open to the pos-
sibility that, in an appropriate case, the threat of imminent 
harm could give rise to a state of necessity. It also acknowl-
edged that a central legal pillar, such as pacta sunt servanda, 
might, in some circumstances, have to yield to environmental 
concerns. Given the Court's acceptance of a safe and balanced 
ecology as an "essential" state interest and its acknowledgment 
of actual harm, the absence of a more extensive treatment was 
surprising to some. 221 What the Court could have. done, how-
ever, was to give some guidance as to the evidentiary standard 
that should be applied in such a case. The imminence of harm 
and the establishment of the harm are inherently linked. Un-
der international watercourse law, a corollary to the principle 
id. at 18-20 nn.99-112 and accompanying text. A good sampling of various statements 
on all sides can be found in Eckstein, supra note 9, at 137-64. 
219. Nor did the Court discuss the extent to which potential or future environ-
mental harm could be taken into account. See Verhoosel, supra note 214, at 250 n.33 
and accompanying text (arguing that in any case the Special Agreement explicitly 
empowers the Court to take into account future consequences) citing Special Agree-
ment, supra note 116, art. 2 (l)(b). 
220. Judgmen.t, 37 LL.M. at 191, 200-201, paras. 85, 140. 
221. Stec & Eckstein, supra note 13, at 46. 
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of equitable and reasonable use is the obligation of states not to 
cause significant harm to other states in their use of a trans-
boundary watercourse. In the Trail Smelter case, the arbitra-
tion tribunal established the evidentiary standard to be applied 
in a case of transboundary environmental harm.222 The tribu-
nal held that no state has the right to use or permit the use of 
its territory in a manner that causes environmental injury 
where the consequences are serious and "the injury is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence."223 In environmental 
cases, which often involve complex interactions of multitudes of 
factors, problems of proof are rampant. A "clear and convinc-
ing" standard of proof would seem to be in opposition to the 
precautionary principle. 
As described above, the precautionary principle employs a 
comparatively skeptical approach to the capabilities of science 
to determine solutions to complex problems. The precautionary 
concept governs the application of science, technology, and eco-
nomics to environmental protection in a way that assumes that 
science alone is ill-equipped to determine the efficient alloca-
tion of resources to address issues of risk and uncertainty.224 
Moreover, it implies a more careful evaluation of potential costs 
by factoring in uncertainty in a way that takes into accoUnt 
cumulative unintended effects. The application of evolving 
norms of environmental law might therefore require revision of 
the evidentiary standard to be applied in cases of trans-
boundary harm. 
As might have been expected, Hungary, relying upon the 
precautionary principle, argued in favor of a much lower evi-
dentiary standard than "clear and convincing." In fact, in its 
brief to the ICJ, Hungary even argued for what essentially 
amounted to a presumption of harm and a shift in the burden 
of proof onto the proponent of potentially harmful activities to 
demonstrate that the proposed activity would not have such 
effects.225 The Court was reluctant, however, to derme the cir-
222. (u.s. v. Can.), 3 U.N.R.LA.A. 1938 (1949). 
223. [d. 
224. See Freestone & Hey, supra note 29, at 12. 
225. Memorial of the Republic of Hungary, para. 6.69. 
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cumstances under which environmental concerns might over-
ride or modify treaty obligations. This may have amounted to 
the imposition of an almost insurmountable burden to establish 
the sufficiency of environmental interests in the face of "sub-
stantial investments." This reluctance to weigh the impact of 
the "preparatory acts" ironically required the Court to look be-
yond the four comers of the treaty to the law of international 
watercourses in order to fmd that the implementation of Vari-
ant C had been illegal. 
Ultimately, the Court properly left the determination of sci-
entific questions (including the factoring of uncertainty) to the 
States.226 While essentially leaving it up to the Parties to nego-
tiate based on the principles of the law on international water-
courses, the Court did not elaborate on these principles.227 Pre-
sumably, Hungary and Slovakia must determine such ques-
tions on a national or bilateral level in a manner determined by 
domestic and international law. In this case, that would in-
clude environmental impact assessment including the trans-
boundary participation of interested members of the public, 
based both on the domestic legislation of each country,228 as 
well as international law . 
226. Judgment, 37 l.L.M. at 200, para 140. The Court further suggested that reo 
course to a third party such as the European Commission might be a useful way to 
resolve scientific differences. Id. at 201, para. 143. 
227. For detailed discussions of the law on international watercourses and how it 
could have been applied in the instant case, see Williams, supra note 8; Schwabach, 
supra note 3; Eckstein, supra note 9; Gabriel E. Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, Interna· 
tional Water Law, Groundwater Resources and tM Danube Dam Case, in PRO-
CEEDINGS, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HYDROLOGISTS XXVII CONGRESS AND 
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF HYDROLOGY 243·248 (Las Vegas, 
Sept. 27 - Oct. 2, 1998). Those who have considered the equitable use doctrine have 
concluded that most of the factors listed under the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the 
Waters of International Rivers, supra note 192, tend to weigh on the side of Hungary in 
the dispute. See Schwabach, supra note 3, at 331; Eckstein, supra note 9, at 111 n.1B4. 
228. In Hungary, the relevant domestic legislation is the Act on Enviromental Pro· 
tection, Law LIII of May 30,1995, translated in 6 HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAw IN FORCE 
1137 (1995); Gov. Decree No. 152/95 on Activities Requiring the Completion of an Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment and on the Detailed Rules of the Connected Administra-
tive Procedure. In Slovakia, the relevant domestic legislation is the Act on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment, No. 127/94 (1994). For a discussion of these laws, see Ste-
phen Stec, Ecological Rights M.vancing tM Rule of Law in Eastern Europe, 13 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 137-43, 151-54 (1998). 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary I Slovakia) 
Case bears witness to the critical role of environmental and 
sustainable development issues in the kinds of deep transfor-
mations arising out of the dynamism in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Through the process of discrediting a hyper-scientific, 
positivistic paradigm, Central and Eastern Europe has directly 
felt the effects of the failure to take a precautionary approach 
in decision-making. It is there that an important role was 
played by the devastated environment in the dissident move-
ment during the latter days of communism, demonstrating the 
connection between the environment and basic rights, democ-
ratization and the rise of voluntary organizations. And it is 
there that an intense dialogue continues to take place in the 
face of the profound impacts of historical change as to the fu-
ture course of human development in the region, with global 
implications. Central and Eastern European developments in 
environmental legislation, in basic concepts relating to rights, 
and in how the law is used and enforced to protect the envi-
ronment, bear witness to an intense struggle, the result of 
which could be a basic social reordering. Given the factors pre-
sent in the region, it is significant, though not surprising, that 
the first case in which the ICJ had to grapple with the concept 
of sustainable development arose there.229 
In abstract terms, therefore, the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project Case may be considered to be a contribution of the re-
gion of Central and Eastern Europe to the future course of sus-
tainable development, in discharge of common but differenti-
ated responsibilities under Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration. 
In this context, the government of Hungary, while not entirely 
consistent in the whole of its pleadings, presentations before 
229. The existence of a case such as Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project on the interna-
tional level ought to lead one to look at national courts for decisions relating to pro-
gressive development of environmental law. One such case is the Protected Forests 
Case decided in 1995 by the Constitutional Court of Hungary. See Court Decision No. 
2811994 (basic right to a healthy environment prohibits the state, having once estab-
lished a certain level of protection, from reducing it). 
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the Court, and actions either before or after the case, 230 did the 
better job in bringing forward sustainable development con-
cepts. While Hungary could do no more than bring these con-
cepts to the attention of the Court, it was up to the Court to do 
something with them. Judged against albeit unrealistic expec-
tations and the opportunities presented to integrate environ-
ment and development, the results of the decision must be con-
sidered to be a mixed bag. 
Further events have demonstrated that at least some of the 
"changed circumstances" argued by Hungary are still open 
questions, involving ongoing political processes, bearing out the 
Court's wisdom in dismissing this argument as a justification 
for termination of the Treaty.231 The ICJ's discussion of sus-
tainable development has improved chances of resort to envi-
ronmental arguments. Furthermore, the sanctity of pacta 
sunta servanda has been eroded somewhat, at least in terms of 
blind adherence without interpretation in the light of evolving 
precepts of international law . If a similar dispute weJ·e to arise 
in the future, the issue of suspension of application of a treaty 
on environmental grounds ought, therefore, to be the first issue 
submitted to the type of process of third-party involvement 
characterized by the Court as evidence of good faith in negotia-
tions.232 Ultimately, given the extent to which the Court has 
declared its terms to be negotiable, the value of the 1977 
Treaty at present is unclear. Why should it be preserved? Its 
only function now appears to be to corral Hungary and Slova-
kia and prevent them from taking extra-legal steps. Yet the 
fact that this could only be done through a treaty regime is the 
230. The struggle within Hungary over integrating environment and development 
versus defense of particular development interests is evident from the difficulties Hun-
gary has had in maintaining a consistent position over the long course of the dispute. 
In a sense this struggle is a microcosm of the struggle over sustainable development in 
the international context and, therefore, bears further scrutiny. 
231. See next section. 
232. Judgment, 37 I.L.M. at 200-201. But see Eckstein, supra note 9, at 83-84 (cit-
ing Dante A. Caponera, Patterns of Cooperation in International Water Law: Principles 
and Institutions, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563, 569 (1985» (Where there is a dispute as to 
the harm that might arise from activities involving a transboundary watercourse, an 
"indispensable facet of good faith negotiations requires the notifying state not to pro-
ceed with the planned activity, or to suspend progress of the activity, until such time as 
the dispute is resolved."). 
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starkest evidence of the undeveloped ,state of the law of sus-
tainable development. The fact of "negotiability" also does not 
address the question as to the operation of evolving precepts 
themselves in a particular case. Where precepts are evolving, 
they are often the subject of disagreement. It will still be diffi-
cult, even after the ICJ decision, for one Party to an agreement 
to insist on specific changes to a negotiated regime by appeal-
ing to newly evolving norms of environmental law. As the pre-
cautionary principle develops, its impact on the assessment of 
potential harm might well put pressure on existing, rigid trea-
ties. Following the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case, there-
fore, states entering into treaties for the implementation of 
joint projects with the potential for significant impact on the 
environment should take care to ensure that the treaties con-
tain provisions guaranteeing that the parties will be able to 
take into account and react flexibly to emerging norms of envi-
ronmentallaw. 
On the other hand, the Court's failure to put the "no action" 
alternative on the same level as modifications to an existing 
regime belies its full appreciation of sustainable development. 
The Court seems to have bee~ so intent on preserving the 
treaty regime as the only means of avoiding uncontrolled con-
flict between the parties that it forced hazy sustainable devel-
opment concepts to fit the result. Its hesitancy to pass on the 
evidence may have effectively disabled it from looking to the 
merits of certain arguments, in spite of the fact that it obvi-
ously made judgments based on that evidence. The Court's 
failure to accept Hungary's interpretation of the precautionary 
principle left unchanged an almost insurmountable burden of 
showing clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood of sig-
nificant harm. These matters taken together, especially the 
implicit perpetuation of an environment/development dichot-
omy, have given insufficient direction to the parties. Judge 
Weeramantry's concepts perhaps open the door to improved 
judgments in the future, whether in the current dispute or in 
subsequent cases before the ICJ. In fact, the Court might very 
soon have another chance to elaborate on the matters in the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project decision, as discussed in the 
postscript below. 
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VIII. POSTSCRIP1': PROSPECTS FOR "GABCIKOVO II" 
A. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE ICJ DECISION 
On September 3, 1998, Slovakia turned back to the ICJ.233 
The immediate justification for Slovakia's submission was the 
allegation that Hungary had not fulfilled its obligations under 
the Court's judgment to reach a settlement within six 
months.?"W To understand how this came about, it is necessary 
to review events following the issuance of the ICJ decision, es-
pecially in Hungary, where the dam issue had been an irritant 
in domestic politics for many years. Somewhat ironically, when 
the ICJ decision was finally issued after years of negotiations 
and legal proceedings, Hungary was being governed by the So-
cialists, many of whom had links to the pre-transition regime. 
Thus, while the first official Hungarian reaction to the decision, 
coming in statements from the legal team, emphasized the 
holding that Nagymaros need not be built, quite different 
statements from the government of Prime Minister Gyula Hom 
soon appeared.235 As the negotiations between the parties 
mandated by the Court's judgment approached, it became more 
and more clear that the government intended to agree to the 
building of a second dam.236 The positions taken by the Hom 
government led to its being embroiled in a public debate over 
the interpretation of the ICJ decision, in which members of the 
government's own legal representation team took part, often 
weighing in against the government. 237 The debate heated up 
233. See ICJ Press Communique: Gabcilwvo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary! Slova-
kia): Slovakia requests an additional Judgment (Sept. 3, 1998) <http://www.icj-
cij.orglidocketlihslihsframe.htm» (hereinafter "ICJ Press Communique"). If Slovakia's 
request is considered to be a request for the interpretation of "Gabcikovo I," this would 
give rise to a new case under ICJ rules. See Request For Interpretation Of The Judg-
ment Of 11 June 1998 in The Case Concerning The Land And Maritime Boundary 
Between Cameroon And Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nig. v. 
Cameroon) General List No. 101 ICJ, 1998. See Boldizsar Nagy & Katalin GyrofTy, 
lranytc Nelku [Without a Compass], 3 BESZELC 26-42 (May 1998). 
234. ICJ Press Communique, supra note 233. 
235. E.g. Zoltan otvos, "Mit mondott ki Hga s mit nem?" ["What did the Hague say 
and what didn't it say?"l. 
236. See Boldizsar Nagy & Katalin GyrfTy, Iranytu Nelkul [Without a Compass], 
BESZL, vol. 3, no.5 (May 1998), at 28 (box). 
237. For the text ofthe Nemcsok Agreement, see NEPSZAVA, March 11, 1998. See, 
e.g., Boldizsar Nagy, Lehetsegeink Haga utan [Our possibilities after the Hague1, 
NEPSZABADSAG (Nov. 17, 1997); Hajnalka Cseke, A hagai itelet nem ir elc epitesi Iwtel-
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in anticipation of elections in April 1998. Meanwhile, Janos 
Nemcsok represented Hungary in negotiations in which he 
made assertions strangely in opposition to the parts of the 
Court's decision favorable to the positions Hungary had taken 
in the proceedings. 238 
While this was going on, Slovakia couldn't believe its luck. 
According to reliable reports, it had anticipated the Hungarian 
negotiating position to be focused on the amount of water to be 
returned to the original course of the Danube. Slovakia 
pressed its advantage, while Hungarian society was arguing 
whether Nemcsok's statements properly represented Hungar-
ian interests and whether he was properly authorized to nego-
tiate. As a result of the negotiations a Framework Agreement 
(the "Nemcsok Agreement") was drafted in which Hungary 
agreed to the building of a second dam. This draft agreement 
was initialed by N emcsok. 239 Further criticism in the press of 
the Nemcsok Agreement led to a split between the Hungarian 
Socialist Party (MSZP) and its junior coalition partner, the 
Free Democrats (SZDSZ). As a result the agreement was not 
signed by the Hom government and debate over it was post-
poned until after the April elections. In parallel, citizens 
started a drive for a referendum on the question of whether 
ezettseget [The Hague Decision Doesn't Call For the Obligation to Build], MAGYAR 
NEMZET (Feb. 16, 1998) (interview with Boldizsar Nagy). For a pro vs. con discussion, 
see Zoltan Otvos, Mit rrwndott ki Haga es mit nem? [What did the Hague say and what 
didn't it say?], NEPSZABADSAG (Jan. 26, 1998). Members of Hungary's legal representa-
tion team continued to interpret the decision in a way that would not require the 
building of a second dam. See, e.g, Boldizsar Nagy, A &s-Nagymarosi Ercmcrendszer-
rei Kapcsolatos Nemzetkozi Jogi Problemak, [The International Legal Problems Con-
nected With the &s (Gabcikovo)-Nagymaros Barrage System], PROCEEDINGS OF THE XI 
MEETING OF THE HUNGARIAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, Gyula, Hungary (Oct. 1997). 
238. For an examination of the differences between statements made by Nemcsok 
and the ICJ decision, see Nemcsok Kontra Hagai Nemzetkozi Birosag [Nemcsok Against 
the International Court of the Hague], in A DUNA VEDELMEBEN A RAGA! DONTES UTAN 
137- 41 (Batthyany Lajos Alapitvany ed., 1998); Boldizsar Nagy & Katalin Gyroffy, 
Iranytc Nelku [Without a Compass], 3 BESZELC 26-42 (May 1998), (also containing 
allegations of Nemcsok's links to special interests in favor of construction of a second 
dam). For an earlier accounting of the battle of experts between environmentalist and 
"hydropower lobby" forces, see OPPORTUNITIES FOR SZIGETKOZ, supra note 92. 
239. For the text of the Nemcsok Agreement, see Nepszaua, March 11, 1998. For a 
discussion of the consistency of the draft. settlement agreement with the ICJ decision 
and with international law, and the legal effect of the initialling of the agreement by 
Nemcsok, see Boldizsar Nagy, Zsebszerzales? [Pocket Agreement?], ELET ES lRODALOM 
(Feb. 23, 1998). 
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Hungary should build a second dam. The results of the elec-
tions, which the MSZP lost {underestimation of the public's 
opposition may have played a significant role in the defeat),240 
rendered the referendum moot when the new government de-
clared itself opposed to construction. 
After the new government disavowed the Nemcsok Agree-
ment, Slovakia announced that it would return the dispute to 
the ICJ for further guidance. In its submission, Slovakia re-
ferred to the initialed Nemcsok Agreement, which had been 
approved by the Government of Slovakia on March 10, 
1998.241 Slovakia, thus, now contends that "on 5 March 1998, 
Hungary postponed its approval and, upon the accession of its 
new Government following the May elections, it has proceeded 
to disavow the draft Framework Agreement and now further 
delays implementing the Judgment. "242 Hungary filed a re-
240. Note the parallel to events in 1989·90. In April 1990, during a time when the 
dam project was an issue in the elections, the Socialists won only 8.5% of the seats in 
the parliament. In contrast with the situation in 1998, however, the Socialists had 
voted 186 to 7, with 74 abstentions, to abandon the works at Nagymarosjust before the 
election. See Schw.abach, supra note 3, at 299 n.60 and accompanying te,tt. 
241. See id. See also, Nagy and GyorfTy, supra note 236, at 29 (box). 
242. Slovakia, relying on Article 5 of the Special Agreement, which provides that ei· 
ther Party may request the Court to determine the modalities for executing the Judg· 
ment if negotiations are unsuccessful for six months following the judgment, requested 
the Court to adjudge and declare: 
1. That Hungary bears responsibility for the failure of the Parties so far to 
agree on the modalities for executing the Judgment of 25 September 1997; 
2. That in accordance with the Court's Judgment of 25 September 1997, the 
obligation of the Parties to take all necessary measures to ensure the 
achievement of the objectives of the Treaty of 16 September 1977 (by which 
they agreed to build the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project) applies to the whole 
geographical area and the whole range of relationships covered by that Treaty; 
3. That, in order to ensure compliance with the Court's Judgment of 25 Sep-
tember 1997, and given that the 1977 Treaty remains in force and that the 
Parties must take all necessary measures to ensure the achievement of the 
objectives of that Treaty: 
(a) With immediate effect, the two ·Parties shall resume their negotiations 
in good faith so as to expedite their agreement on the modalities for achieving 
the objectives of the Treaty of 16 September 1977; 
(b) In particular, Hungary is bound to appoint forthwith its Plenipotentiary 
as required under Article 3 of the Treaty, and to utilize all mechanisms for 
joint studies and cooperation established by the Treaty, and generally to con-
duct its relations with Slovakia on the basis of the Treaty; 
(c) The Parties shall proceed by way of a Framework Agreement leading to 
a Treaty providing for any necessary amendments to the 1977 Treaty; 
(d) In order to achieve this result, the Parties shall conclude a binding 
Framework Agreement not later than 1 January 1999; 
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sponse on December 7, 1998, in which it objected to Slovakia's 
submission on the grounds that the Nemcsok Agreement was 
not binding, failure of negotiations was not final, and the par-
ties' were still under an obligation to negotiate. 243 
Whether there will be a "Gabcikovo Ir before the ICJ de-
pends on the success of the continuing settlement negotiations 
between the Parties. These negotiations were ongoing as of 
early 1999, with the ICJ apparently taking a "wait-and-see" 
attitude. However, there were no indications of a break-
through on key issues such as the building of a second dam and 
the amount of compensation. Thus, it appeared likely that the 
ICJ would be compelled to elaborate on its decision in "Gabcik-
ovo 1." While Slovakia has asked the Court to consider the nar-
row issues of the legal effect of the initialed N emcsok Agree-
ment, and whether Hungary has violated the Court's order by 
not reaching agreement within the specified time, it can be ex-
pected that additional issues will be raised in further proceed-
ings. Among the issues that the Court is likely to be asked to 
decide are: (1) the specific meaning of the Court's pronounce-
ments concerning the need to build a second dam and the zero 
sum solution;244 (2) what evolving norms of the international 
law of sustainable development the Parties should take note of 
in their negotiations; and (3) specifically whether procedures 
such as EIA with transboundary public participation are neces-
sary. The Court may also be asked to elaborate further on 
some parts of its ruling which appear not to be wholly consis-
tent with one another - for example, the holding that the im-
(e) The Parties shall reach a final agreement on the necessary measures to 
ensure the achievement of the objectives of the 1977 Treaty in a treaty to enter 
into force by 30 June 2000; 
4. That, should the Parties fail to conclude a Framework Agreement or a fi-
nal agreement by the dates specified at sub-paragraphs 3 (d) and (e) above: 
(a) The 1977 Treaty must be complied with in accordance with its spirit and 
terms; and 
(b) Either party may request the Court to proceed with the allocation of re-
sponsibility for any breaches of the Treaty and reparation for such breaches. 
ICJ Press Communique, supra note 233. 
243. Interview with Boldizsar Nagy, Assistant Professor, Eotvos Lorand University, 
Budapest, January 1999. See also Hungary Wants More Time Before Deciding On 
Dam, 2 RFEIRL NEWSLINE, Part II (Dec. 1998) 4. 
244. As to the specific meaning of the Court's pronouncements concerning the need 
to build a second dam and the zero sum solution. See Nagy & GyroflY, supra note 238, 
at 29. 
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plementation of Variant C was an internationally wrongful act, 
while the substantial progress towards its implementation did 
not indicate bad faith. These questions will be considered so 
long as the Court does not hold the Nemcsok Agreement to be 
binding on Hungary. 
B. THE ROLE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LEGAL NORMS 
IN THE COURT ORDERED NEGOTIATIONS 
Do the concepts in Judge Weeramantry's opinion offer a 
possible solution? Would his view require the Court to do more 
with respect to the scientific evidence, the evidentiary stan-
dard, or the burden of proof? The concurring opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry pointed to a customary international norm of 
environmental impact assessment. Certainly EIA is the most 
common mechanism for taking into account environmental 
considerations in decision-making, consistent both with the 
Magic Articles, as interpreted, and the sustainable develop-
ment formula for integrating environment and development. 
Judge Weeramantry's view was indicated in another case in-
volving environmental issues, the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand 
v. France) Case.245 In connection with that dispute, he said, 
"[i]t is clear that on an issue of the magnitude of that which 
brings New Zealand before this Court the principle of Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment would prima facie be applicable 
in terms of the current state of international environmental 
law.''246 
Yet in the present case, it is important to go beyond the 
simple declaration that EIA is applicable as a principle. If EIA 
is to be used by the Parties simply to promote their own views 
as to the scientific evidence, it will not be useful. It is, thus, 
necessary also to establish particular standards and parame-
ters for EIA to be applied in a manner that will assist in the 
resolution of underlying issues of disagreement on the inter-
pretation of facts. While it is difficult to speak of global stan-
dards on EIA, there is clearly a highly developed set of norms 
245. 1995 I.C.J. 288. 
246. [d. at 345 (opinion of D.O. Wee raman try). 
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pertaining to EIA on a regional level in Europe, based upon 
domestic legislation and the legislation of the European 
Union. 247 It is also true that these standards are already re-
flected to a great extent in the domestic legislation of Hungary 
and Slovakia. Thus, to give shape to the principle, one could 
look to regional, i.e., European, norms in order to provide par-
ticular content as to the application of a norm of customary in-
ternational law. The notion that regional customary norms 
could be applied as a matter of customary international law is 
held by some scholars to be an implication of the notion of "spe-
cial customary rules" applicable to particular states. 248 It is 
also apparent from the notion in Article 38 (1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute that a legal principle need not be accepted globally in 
order to become international law, as discussed below. 
With respect to transboundary issues, the Espoo Convention 
on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context249 may be looked to for guidance as to the content of 
emerging norms of customary sustainable development law. 250 
As of July 18, 1998, Hungary had ratified the Convention and 
Slovakia was a signatory.251 The Espoo Convention imposes a 
general obligation on States Parties to "take all appropriate 
and effective measures to prevent, reduce and control signifi-
cant adverse transboundary environmental impact from pro-
247. European Commission Directive 85/337 on Environmental Impact Assessment, 
1985 O.J. (L 175, 5.7) 40. 
248. See, e.g., M.E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw AND TREATIES 33 
(1985), cited in Verhoosel, supra note 214, at 251. There should not be any jurisdic-
tional obstacle to the ICJ's recognition of an international norm that operates among 
particular states rather than on a global level. In any case, regional norms will be 
more significant in the course of negotiations between the Parties than they would be 
in a theoretical "Gabcikovo II." 
249. Supra note 164. The Convention came into force in 1997. 
250. Judge Weeramantry mentioned the Espoo Convention along with several other 
international documents recognizing the principle of EIA. Weeramantry, 37 I.L.M. at 
214 n.81. 
251. It is settled that conventions may be evidence of customary international law 
expressing norms that might apply even to states that are not parties to the subject 
convention. This rule was applied in the present case in respect of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties. It may even be applied in the case of conventions that 
have not yet come into force. See discussion of the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty in 
NANCY KONTOU, THE TERMINATION AND REVlSION OF TREATIES IN THE LIGHT OF NEW 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw (1994). 
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posed activities."252 Specifically, it requires a country to under-
take an EIA proceeding, according to specified standards in-
cluding transboundary participation, in the approval process 
for specific253 activities. 254 
A significant standard for EIA that is found in the Espoo 
Convention, as well as the domestic EIA legislation of Hungary 
and Slovakia, is the inclusion of participation of the public in 
decision-making and the taking into account of the public's 
comments.2M Emerging norms of environmental law concern-
ing the substance and procedure of public participation in envi-
ronmental decision-making are found in the recently adopted 
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participa-
tion in Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in Environ-
mental Matters.256 It is evident from the facts and circum-
stances of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case that such 
matters are essential to this case, and decision-making relating 
to the Project must be based on a participatory process in order 
to be successful. As the norms relating to Rio Principle 10257 
have developed since 1992, it is increasingly clear that, no mat-
ter whether the governments of the respective countries agree 
to build something, they are no longer the fmal arbiters. A 
252. Supra note 164, art. 2.l. 
253. These activities are listed in an annex to the convention. For activities not 
listed, there is a procedure for negotiation between parties as to the application of the 
convention to other activities likiely to cause a significant adverse transboundary im-
pact. See id. art. 2.5, Annex III. 
254. [d. art 3. 
255. [d. arts. 2.6, 3.8, 4.2. 
256. June 25,1998, U.N. Doc. ECE/CEP/43 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention!. Hun-
gary is a signatory to this convention. The Slovakian government issued a decision to 
sign the convention, but did not do so by the deadline. Among the 25 countries which 
are either members of the European Union or which have accession agreements with 
the EU, only Slovakia has not signed the Aarhus Convention. While the Convention is 
not yet in force, the signatories have agreed to take steps towards the early implemen-
tation of its provisions. 
257. Supra note 2. Principle 10 states: 
IElnvironmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by 
public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in 
their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making proc-
esses. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by 
making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administra-
tive proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided. 
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broad, inclusive process taking into account various interests 
must take place without the presupposition of results, includ-
ing the "no action" alternative. Hungary is also a party to the 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Wa-
tercourses and International Lakes.258 As of May 1997, Slova-
kia was not a party to this convention. This convention calls 
for regular, "joint or coordinated assessments of the conditions 
of transboundary waters and the effectiveness of measures 
taken for the prevention, control and reduction of trans-
boundary impact," the results of which are to be made accessi-
ble to the public. 259 
In addition to the above-mentioned conventions, the Parties 
might also take note of Article 8 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms,260 which has been interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights in a manner that essentially guarantees the 
right to a healthy environment by placing upon authorities the 
obligation to protect the environment. 261 Authorities have been 
found to have violated Article 8 in cases where they failed to 
provide adequate environmental information262 or to enforce 
domestic environmental law. 263 This Article, by extension, ap-
plies to the consideration of environmental impacts before deci-
sion-making as a means of protecting basic rights. Both Hun-
258. Supra note 189. 
259. [d. art. 11.3. 
260. Nov. 4,1950,213 U.N.T.S. 222, as amended. Article 8, titled "Right to Respect 
for Private and Family Life," states: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being 9f the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others. 
[d. at 230. 
261. See, e.g. Guerra & Others v. Italy, XX Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. X) 
(116/1996n35/932); Lopez Ostra v. Spain, XX Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) Judgment of9 Dec. 
1994, series A No. 303-C, p. 55, § 55 (1994). 
262. Guerra, XX Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. X) (116/1996n35/932). 
263. Lopez Ostra, XX Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) Judgment of 9 Dec. 1994, series A No. 
303-C, p. 55, § 55 
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gary and Slovakia have ratified this convention as members of 
the Council of Europe. 
While application of a norm of EIA with public participation 
is fairly straightforward, that of another key consideration -
the precautionary principle - is not. As alluded to above, it is 
arguable whether a principle such as the precautionary princi-
ple has become fully enough developed on a global level to be 
considered a norm of customary international law. 264 Yet, if it 
is sufficiently developed on a regional level, it might enter into 
negotiations through other means. While domestic acceptance 
of such a principle might not be relevant to the dispute before 
the ICJ, it is interesting to note that Czechoslovakia had ac-
cepted the precautionary principle in federal legislation. 265 Ap-
plication of the theory on compatibility of international and 
national environmental law would, however, mandate its con-
sideration.266 It has also been argued that the fact of expres-
sion of the intention of accession to the ED should color the ap-
plicability of the precautionary principle found in art. 130r(2) of 
the Maastricht Treaty267 to the dispute.268 
264. Positions both pro and con fmd BOme support in the literature.l?g., C. Tinker, 
State Responsibility and the Precautionary Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 
29, at 53 (The precautionary principle is not such a clear obligation as to trigger state 
responsibility); J ames Cameron & J. Abouchar, The Status of the PreclIutionary Prin· 
ciple in International Law, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 29, at 30·31 (Sufficient state 
practice has developed BO as to justify the argument that the principle is customary 
international law). But note that "continuous EIA" is one application of the precau-
tionary principle identified by Hohmann. See supra note 15. 
265. See Verhoosel, supra note 214, at n.45. 
266. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
267. Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 22411) reprinted m 31 I.L.M. 247 
<http://europa.eu.intiabc/objltreatieslen/entocOl.htm>. 
268. Verhoosel, supra note 214, at 251. The precautionary principle is thus an ele-
ment of the environmental acquis communautaire of EU membership applicable to 
Hungary and Slovakia. Verhoosel proceeds to offer counter-arguments to this supposi-
tion. Id. (First, the unreported case of R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex 
parte Duddridge et al., Oct. 3, 1994, which held that art. 130r is binding on the Com-
munity, but not the individual Member States, and, second, the presumed extension of 
temporary exemptions towards new Member States) (citation omitted). Equally suc-
cessful might be pointing to the March 10, 1993 resolution of the European Parliament 
calling for creation of an international wetlands preservation area in the Szigetkoz, 
which some scientists contend would be impossible if the original barrage system were 
put into operation. See OPPORTUNITIES FOR SZIGETKOZ, supra note 92. However, one 
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With respect to the Danube, the notion of a "Law of the 
River" has been suggested,269 on the grounds that a possible 
source of norms of particular app~ication to a unique feature of 
the natural environment could be the practice of neighboring 
states which share the feature. Applying a Law of the River 
regime would require examination of agreements and custom-
ary norms relating to other sections of the Danube, including 
the Iron Gate dam project (on the border between Federal 
Yugoslavia and Romania), the Danube-Black Sea Canal, and 
the Rhine-Main-Danube Waterway.270 Also relevant would be 
instruments dealing with the international administration of 
the Danube, or those determining rights in settlement of con-
flicts, such as the Treaty of Trianon which settled borders at 
the end of WWI,271 which established an international Hydrau-
lic System Commission, or the Convention Regarding the Re-
gime of Navigation on the Danube,272 establishing an interna-
tional Danube Commission, whether or not Hungary or 
Czechoslovakia were parties to such agreements. Note, how-
ever, that the converse of the argument in favor of the Law of 
the River would be that customary international law relating to 
a particular watercourse would not necessarily be applicable to 
a future dispute involving a different watercourse. 273 
commentator contends that the resolution, while valid, was passed late on a Friday 
afternoon by a vote of 11-1 with one abstention, out of 524 deputies. See EGIL LEJON, 
GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS: OLD AND NEW SINS 20 (Martin Urbancik & Thomas Grey 
trans., 1996). 
269. See Schwabach, supra note 3, at 340-41. Schwabach has argued that, in the 
same manner that treaties concerning transboundary watercourses must take into 
account the peculiarities of the particular river system, so the development of custom-
ary international law with respect to transboundary watercourses must also take such 
peculiarities into account. 
270. See id. at 304-11. 
271. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, June 
4, 1920, United States Senate: Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, &. 
Agreements 3539. Schwabach points out that art. 282 of the Trianon Treaty set up a 
hierarchy of interests in the River, according to which "irrigation, water-power, fisher-
ies, and other national interests" had priority over navigation. Schwabach, supra note 
3, at 319 n.198. 
272. Supra note 76. 
273. A Law of the River might also give rise to a Law of a Part of the River, for ex-
ample the Danube border region between Hungary and Slovakia. In this case the 
Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a River Administration in the Rajka-
Gonyu Sector of the Danube, Feb. 27 1968, Czech.-Hung. 640 U.N.T.8. 66, and Annex 
II to the Convention Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube. supra note 
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Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ274 specifies: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, 
shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recog-
nized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
oflaw. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the 
Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties 
agree thereto .... 
In Frontier Dispute, Judgment (Burkina Fasol Republic of 
Mali),275 the Court considered whether the practice of a par-
ticular state could be applied against it as a matter of custom-
ary internationallaw.276 The Court there stated: 
[l]t is on the basis of international law that the Cham-
ber will have to fix the frontier line, weighing for that 
76, at 219 (agreeing to further discussion concerning whether a special river admini-
stration should be set up for the Gabcikovo-Gonyu sector of the Danube, or whether the 
application of article 4 and another article would be sufficient), would be relevant, not 
only for purposes of interpretation of a Bubsequent agreement between the same par-
ties, but as evidence of a customary regime related to a particular geographical feature. 
274. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), T.S. No. 
993,3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.UNITED NATIONS 1052. 
275. 1986I.C.J. 554 (Judgment). 
276. [d. 
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purpose the legal force of the respective evidence sub-
mitted by the Parties for its appraisal. It is therefore of 
little significance whether Mali adopted a particular ap-
proach, either in the course of negotiations on frontier 
questions, or with respect to the conclusions of the Legal 
Sub-Commission of the Organization of African Unity 
Mediation Commission, and whether that approach may 
or may not be construed to reflect a specific position, or 
indeed to signify acquiescence, towards the principles 
and rules, including those which determine the respec-
tive weight of the various kinds of evidence applicable to 
the dispute. If these principles and rules are applicable 
as elements of law in the present case, they remain so 
whatever Mali's attitude. If the reverse is true, the 
Chamber could only take account of them if the two Par-
ties had requested it to do so, or had given such princi-
ples and rules a special place in the Special Agreement, 
as "rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
States. "'277 
If the practice of a particular state cannot be applied against 
it as a matter of customary intemationallaw, it is hard to see 
how the practice of neighboring states could be. There appears 
to be no justification for a "Law of the River" to be applied to 
the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia, either on the basis 
of the ICJ Statute or the Special Agreement. 
Might Hungary's mugwumpery in the face of political tur-
moil engendered by the dam case prevent the Court from ex-
pressing for a second time sympathy for Hungary's difficulty in 
forming an integrated position? The answer might depend on 
the approach taken in Hungary's further submissions. Cer-
tainly, recent events have confIrmed the wisdom of the Court's 
approach to the "changed circumstances" argument. Hungary's 
277. ld. at 575 (citing Statute, supra note 274, art. 38, para. 1 (a), of the Statute)." 
See also Case Concerning Continental Shelf (Tunisia !Libyan Arab-Jamhiriya) 1982 
I.C.J. 37, para. 23 ("[Wlhile the Court is ... bound to have regard to all the legal sources 
specified in Article 38, paragraph I, of the Statute ... it is also bound, in accordance with 
paragraph 1(a), of that Article, to apply the provisions of the Special Agreement."), 
cited in Frontier Dispute, supra note 275, at 575. 
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continuing internal struggle demonstrates that the shift in po-
litical assumptions, competing paradigms and regimes that is 
called the process of "transition" cannot be pinpointed to a sin-
gle momentary event, nor can it be placed wholly in the past. 
It would also be a mistake to characterize the process of trans i-
tion solely as a matter of reviving national identity through the 
throwing off of blanket foreign domination, since the Hom gov-
ernment was a freely-elected political continuation of the "pre-
Revolutionary" reform socialist government. This emphasizes 
that the processes are at least in substantial part internal ones, 
involving a struggle of systems of interests with strong domes-
tic support. At this stage, however, the struggle has taken an 
important step through the popular referendum in the form of 
elections on the policies of the reform socialists. It would also 
be extremely difficult and perhaps alienating to reopen certain 
issues, such as the succession argument. Furthermore, the 
Court has expressed its fIrm intention to preserve the 1977 
Treaty as the chosen mechanism for resolution. Yet the Court 
should continue to take note of the ''unprecedented challenge" 
facing the countries in transition, as recognized in Agenda 
21,278 a challenge which has proven by this very case to be ex-
traordinarily complex. 
Because the questions at the root of the dispute between 
Hungary and Slovakia are not entirely of a legal nature, the 
Court's decision has not managed to achieve a full 
settlement.279 Moreover, the uncomfortable compromise that is 
the ICJ decision has not aided the chances of settlement of the 
dispute between the parties as much as it possibly could. Each 
side can draw upon parts of the judgment in support of its own 
position. At the same time, the principles that the Court used 
can be applied to interpret the decision's contrary points as 
being at least partly mistaken - Hungary with respect to its 
purported termination, Slovakia with respect to the legality of 
Variant C. Perhaps a more courageous and internally consis-
tent decision in "Gabcikovo If' would be useful. But, the 
changing position of Hungary shows that beneath the dispute 
278. See supra note 5. 
279. For a discussion of the decision from a Hungarian point of view, see A HAGAI 
DONTES (Janos Vargha ed., 1997). 
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other factors of a more profound nature that are possibly not 
solvable by a court of law are at work. Contrary to "reducing or 
eliminating one source of friction"280 in a troublesome region, 
the ICJ decision may have merely shifted the debate,281 and as 
the Parties are so far apart on their understanding of sustain-
able development, the Gabcikovo-N agymaros dispute shows no 
signs of ending soon. 
280. Schwabach, supra note 3, at 341. 
281. See Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Envi-
ronmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105-20 (Fall 1995). 
[C)ourts and arbitral tribunals currently play only a relatively minor role in 
addressing international environmental issues. Third-party dispute resolution 
has resolved few environmental problems.... The establishment of an envi-
ronmental chamber of the International Court of Justice and the recent cases 
between Nauru and Australia and between Hungary and Slovakia may signal 
the emergence of a great judicial role. But, at present, legal discourse that 
presupposes a judicial audience plays to a largely empty house. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
Bodansky contends that customary international law, rather than truly reflecting 
state practice, reflects statements of what state.practice ought to be, and its value, if 
any, is to inform bilateral or multilateral negotiations over mechanisms for environ-
mental control. 
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